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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Commute Mode Choice, Parking Policies, and Social Influence
By
Nagwa Khordagui
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Professor Jan Brueckner, Chair
This dissertation examines the impact of parking policies and social influence on commute
mode choice using discrete choice analysis. A key feature of the dissertation is overcoming the
problem of insufficient data by using unique datasets, building unique datasets, or exploring
appropriate estimation strategies and assumptions.
Chapter 1 studies the impact of parking prices on the decision to drive to work using the
California Household Travel Survey. The chapter tackles estimation challenges posed by
insufficient parking information. The first challenge is the estimation of parking prices for
those who do not drive, which is addressed by using a sample selection model. The second
challenge is to understand the effect of the extent of the prevalence of Employer-Paid parking
coupled with incentive programs offered in-lieu of parking. To address this challenge, two
extreme scenarios are examined, and a range for the marginal effects of parking prices is
estimated; one scenario assumes everyone receives Employer-Paid parking coupled with in-
lieu of parking incentives, and the second assumes that no one is offered such incentives.
The results suggest that higher parking prices reduce driving, regardless of the followed
approach. It is estimated that a 10% increase in parking prices leads to a 1 - 2 percentage
point decline in the probability of driving to work. Moreover, there seems to be no evidence of
xi
sample selection bias. The evidence suggests that parking pricing can indeed be an effective
transportation demand management tool.
Chapter 2 extends the analysis of Chapter 1 to simultaneously estimate the impact of parking
pricing, parking availability, and urban form on commute mode choice. The joint role of
these three factors is examined using a dataset that is constructed by merging three major
different data sources. The California Household Travel Survey data are matched to two
unique datasets on parking for Los Angeles County; one for prices and the other availability.
Chapter 2 first examines how these three factors affect the binary decision of whether to
drive, while controlling for a rich set of covariates. The analysis then becomes more specific
and examines how these factors affect particular commute modes in a multinomial context.
The results indicate that parking prices have a significant negative impact on the decision
to drive to work, where a 10% increase in parking prices is associated with a 1.1% drop
in the probability of driving to work. Both on-street and off-street parking availability at
home, as well as urban form measures of the workplace tract, are found to significantly
affect commute mode choices. These findings have important policy implications in terms of
minimum parking requirements, maximum parking standards, employer-paid parking, and
parking pricing policies.
Chapter 3, on the other hand, examines the impact of a number of fundamental determinants
of commute mode choice on transit use, and introduces the role of social influence. The deter-
minants explored cover socioeconomic characteristics, built environment and neighborhood
characteristics, transit accessibility, and trip characteristics. Social interactions have been
found to affect many of the decisions of economic agents, and are likely to play a role in the
decision to use transit. A unique dataset is built to conduct this analysis across a number of
major US cities and examine the effects in both the residence and workplace neighborhoods,
where a neighborhood is defined as a census tract. Social influence is explored along three
different dimensions: space (neighborhood), income, and race. A novel instrumental variable
xii
is constructed in order to identify spatial social influence, and an alternative identification
strategy is devised to identify income-group and racial social influence. The evidence sug-
gests that spatial social influence exists among both coworkers and residential neighbors,
and that peer effects among coworkers are larger than those among residential neighbors.
Moreover, income-group social influence, among both coworkers and residential neighbors,
plays a significant role in the rich commuter’s decision to use transit. However, racial social
influence does not affect a commuter’s decision to use transit, regardless of race.
xiii
Chapter 1
Parking Prices and the Decision to
Drive to Work: Evidence from
California
1.1 Introduction
Parking in the United States, in many cases, is either underpriced or provided free of charge,
which leads to several market distortions. The cost of provision of parking, comprised of
land, construction, and maintenance costs, varies widely from place to place, and from one
form to another (surface, underground, structure, etc.), but is nevertheless a substantial
figure. For example, Cutter et al. (2016) estimate construction costs to be over $5,000 for a
surface parking space in Los Angeles, and over $36,000 for an underground space. By offering
free or underpriced parking, the incidence of the cost of parking is shifted from the users to
the rest of society (Shoup, 2005). Parking costs are passed on to everyone through higher
commodity or service prices (in the case of shopping centers), lower salaries (in the case
1
of employer-paid parking), and higher taxes (in the case of on-street and publicly-provided
parking). Moreover, free and underpriced parking in many cases translate to a classic case
of excess demand for parking spots, leading to what is known in the literature as cruising,
which contributes significantly to traffic congestion, and has been estimated to represent
about 30% of downtown congestion (Shoup, 2005). Furthermore, the availability of free
and underpriced parking distorts people’s travel mode choices, encouraging them to drive
instead of considering other available alternatives. As a result, free and underpriced parking
amplify the negative externalities associated with vehicle usage; namely, traffic congestion
and pollution.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine whether parking prices can significantly
influence the decision to drive alone to work. There is growing evidence that parking price
influences travel mode choices, and thus can be used as an effective tool for travel demand
management. The empirical evidence, however, is not well-developed, and although there
are extensive empirical travel mode choice studies, only a few examine the impact of parking
prices. Prior empirical studies find consistent evidence that higher parking prices lead to
less driving. Willson (1992) finds that driving to work drops significantly in downtown Los
Angeles when commuters have to pay for parking, while Brownstone and Golob (1992) find
that parking incentives to rideshare reduce driving alone in Southern California. Miller and
Everett (1982) find that, in a sample of 15 worksites in Washington DC, driving alone drops
after the elimination of existing parking subsidies. Other studies use stated preferences to
investigate the relationship in Sydney (Hensher and King, 2001) and Vancouver (Washbrook
et al., 2006), and some use revealed preferences to investigate the relationship in Toronto
(Gillen, 1977), Portland (Peng et al., 1996; Hess, 2001), and Seattle (Su and Zhou, 2012).
Lack of parking data is a major hindrance to investigating the impact of parking prices on
travel mode choice. This paper relies on reported parking data from the 2012 California
Household Travel Survey (CHTS); a cross-sectional dataset covering all of California, thus
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offering an opportunity to address the question at a state level, which has not been done
before. The focus of the study is on work commutes, which allows the examination of
recurrent behavior and ensures that the commuter is aware of the parking price he will face
at the destination. Moreover, the study focuses on the impact of parking prices on the
decision to drive versus not driving, and not on the various travel mode choices. The main
objective of the paper is to establish that parking prices can reduce vehicle usage, regardless
of the alternative modes chosen. If so, then parking prices can be used as a policy tool to
reduce the negative externalities associated with vehicle usage as long as there is not a large
shift to ride-sharing services like Uber or Lyft.
The nature of the dataset gives rise to questions that were not necessarily relevant in previous
studies. Parking prices are only reported for those who drive, but unobserved for those who
do not. To address this problem, different econometric techniques are used to impute parking
prices for non-drivers. This study thus offers a way to estimate parking prices, noting that
whether parking prices are observed is conditional on not driving, which may give rise to
sample selection bias. Therefore, a sample selection model is estimated, and there seems
to be no evidence of sample selection bias. Alternatively, parking prices are imputed by
averaging the reported parking prices in the neighborhood.
Another issue arises from the lack of information on whether the commuter is offered
employer-paid (EP) parking, and if so, whether any incentives are offered in lieu of free
parking. There is evidence that EP parking encourages vehicle usage on work commute
trips. EP parking is widespread in the United States. Brueckner and Franco (2018) develop
a theoretical model that shows how road usage increases as a result of EP parking, and
several case studies investigate the impact of EP parking on driving to work. For example,
Willson and Shoup (1990) provide a survey of five case studies that examine the impact of
EP parking on the commute mode choice. The evidence consistently suggests that a greater
share of employees drive alone when offered EP parking. The fact that whether commuters
3
receive EP parking is unobservable does not in itself pose a problem for the paper’s empirical
strategy. Those who receive EP parking are typically either reporting parking for free at
work or do not report on parking prices at all. Since EP parking is perceived by commuters
as free parking, it is reasonable to assume they face a cost of $0 for parking.
On the other hand, the fact that whether a commuter is offered an incentive in-lieu of parking
is unobservable represents a challenge to the current empirical investigation. Incentives,
such as the cash-out program, translate into a parking opportunity cost. Indeed, evidence
suggests that commuters alter their commute mode choice in response to such incentives.
Shoup (1997a) assesses the effectiveness of California’s cash-out parking law, which requires
employers to provide employees with the option to receive cash in lieu of free parking. The
findings for eight case studies in Southern California indicate that, on average, driving alone
to work dropped from 76% to 63%, whereas the other commute modes all rose. Ignoring
the arising parking opportunity cost because of lack of information in the CHTS dataset
could potentially lead to an upward bias of any estimates of the impact of parking prices on
the decision to drive. This study, therefore, extends the analysis to explore the relationship
in question under the assumption that all commuters are offered EP parking as well as an
alternative compensation in-lieu of free parking, i.e., there is always an opportunity cost of
parking. This is then compared to the results obtained under an initial set of assumptions
of absence of in-lieu of parking incentives, i.e., absence of an opportunity cost of parking for
those who do not report paying for parking.
Therefore, this paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it empir-
ically estimates the effects of parking prices on the decision to drive to work in the state
of California using revealed preferences data, and improves our understanding of the effec-
tiveness of parking prices for travel demand management. Second, it addresses the issue of
missing parking prices conditional on not driving and finds that sample selection bias is not
a concern. Third, the paper overcomes the issue of lack of information on the prevalence of
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cash-out programs by estimating parking prices for two extreme situations and then estimat-
ing the impact of parking prices on the decision to drive, producing a range for the effect.
Fourth, a large number of covariates are controlled for and are constructed by combining
data from various sources using Geographic Information System (GIS) tools and Google
Maps, exploiting the availability of home and work locations.
It is important to note that this paper does not make any assumptions on the prevalence
of EP or in-lieu of parking incentives. The findings indicate a statistically significant effect
of parking prices on the decision to drive, regardless of the adopted approach, and in any
scenario. The results are robust to the inclusion of various socioeconomic and trip-related
variables. Average marginal effects of parking prices are in the range of -0.1 to -0.2, which
implies that an increase of parking prices by 10% leads to a 1 - 2 percentage point decrease
in the probability of driving.
A key assumption of this paper is that commuters distinguish between parking prices and
other monetary costs of the commute trip. A trip-related monetary cost is defined as the
cost incurred to travel from the origin to the destination, whereas the parking price is an
additional cost that is independent of the trip itself and any trip-related costs, and arises only
if there is a need to park a vehicle, i.e., if the commute mode is driving alone or carpooling.
Traditional models, on the other hand, typically aggregate all monetary costs. However, the
assessment of the impact of parking prices using such a model would only be valid under the
unrealistic assumptions that parking cost represents a fixed proportion of the total monetary
cost, or that the impact of parking costs is identical to that of the other monetary trip-related
costs (Feeney, 1989). In fact, Feeney (1989) lists a number of studies that model parking
prices distinctly and argues that a separate measure for parking prices is needed in order to
assess the impact of the parking on travel mode choice. Moreover, Gillen (1977) finds that
the coefficients of parking prices and other monetary costs are significantly different. Ideally,
one would estimate both models and compare the results. However, due to the nature of the
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dataset as well as the fact that it is cross-sectional, it is not possible to adequately account
for trip-related monetary costs, and so the impact of parking prices is modeled separately.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the construction of
the sample data used while section 1.3 introduces the basic model. Section 1.4 describes the
estimation methods used under the assumption that parking price is known for all drivers but
missing for all non-drivers, i.e., commuters not reporting paying for parking face $0 in terms
of opportunity cost. This section includes the Sample Selection model estimation as well
as an alternative average price estimation. Results for these estimations are presented and
briefly discussed. Section 1.5 describes the estimation method under the assumption that
parking price is missing for a lot of drivers in addition to all non-drivers, i.e., commuters
not reporting paying for parking face an opportunity cost. Again, results are presented
and briefly discussed. Section 1.6 brings all the findings together and discuss the main
implications, whereas Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Data
The 2012 CHTS dataset is obtained from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL).
The dataset includes information on work and home locations, trip purpose, mode of trans-
portation, whether parking prices are paid and how much is paid, parking location type,
among other things. The dataset does not offer any information on whether EP parking is
provided, nor on whether a cash-out option is offered (or any other incentive packages dis-
couraging driving alone to work). Moreover, no data are collected on the price a non-driver
would face had he been driving. The location of each destination is available at the census
tract level in the publicly available dataset; however, exact locations (geocoded addresses)
are available through restricted access to the NREL secured data portal.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Full Sample Drive Alone Alternative Mode
Observations 6,793 5,194 1,599
Work Counties 26
Work Zipcodes 216
Pay for Parking 3.40%
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Household Income ($) 115,503 114,704 118,113
(72,558) (72,296) (73,372)
Household Size 3 3 3
(1) (1) (1)
Average Income ($) 43,475 43,023 44,960
(35,811) (35,709) (36,118)
Age 45 46 44
(16) (15) (16)
Female 46% 46% 46%
High School 97% 97% 95%
College Degree 62% 59% 69%
White 74% 74% 72%
Trip Characteristics
Distance (miles) 15.61 15.48 16.01
(15.77) (15.52) (16.58)
Driving Time (mins) 23 23 23
(16) (16) (15)
Transit time (mins) 35 36 32
(21) (21) (21)
Transit Time Cost (ratio) 3.19 3.38 2.59
(4.2) (4.41) (3.34)
Transit-Work Distance (miles) 0.31 0.35 0.19
(0.43) (0.45) (0.3)
Transit-Home Distance (miles) 0.54 0.58 0.4
(0.52) (0.54) (0.44)
Peak Traffic Hours 54% 53% 59%
Chain 50% 50% 48%
Neighborhood Characteristics
Density of Work Tract (person/sq mile) 8,200 7,141 11,682
(9,427) (8,103) (12,227)
Density of Home Tract (person/sq mile) 8,533 7,683 11,324
(8,839) (7,773) (11,235)
Standard errors in parentheses
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1.2.1 Sample
The sample is composed of 6,793 work trips to 216 zipcode areas. Table 1.1 provides summary
statistics for the main variables used. The analysis is carried out at the zipcode level.
Households that do not have a vehicle are eliminated since driving alone is not a viable
option. Destination zipcodes where no one pays for parking, whether for work or non-work
purposes, are excluded. The sample coverage is thus reduced to 26 counties from a total of
58. A list of the counties included in the study can be found in the appendix. Restricting
the sample to work commutes permits the analysis of recurrent frequent behavior rather
than occasional trips where individuals may or may not know of parking prices in advance.
Furthermore, non-work trips could also be subject to venue-choice modifications.
1.2.2 Variables
Commute Mode
The variable of interest is a binary variable indicating whether the worker drives alone to
work. Therefore, a value of 0 includes transit, carpooling, walking, cycling, and passengers.
Over 76% of commuters drive alone.
Parking
Overall, 3.4% of those who drive alone report paying for parking. All of those who park
at the destination location either report paying nothing for parking or do not report at all,
and those who report paying are either parking on-street, or at an off-site parking facility.
Figure 1.1 shows the share of those who pay for parking in each county, which is computed
as the ratio of those who drive and pay to those who drive and do not pay (or do not
report on paying). Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for parking prices. The first 4 rows
present summary statistics for parking prices in the sample of interest; namely, commuters.
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The last 2 rows, on the other hand, present summary statistics for parking prices in the
sample made up of both commuters and non-commuters traveling to the 216 zipcodes of the
sample. The table shows statistics for parking prices including zero prices, i.e., accounting
for free parking, and also parking prices excluding zero prices, i.e., including paid parking
only (non-zero prices).
Figure 1.1: Share of Drivers who Pay for Parking
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Several socioeconomic variables are included in the model as controls. To control for income,
the household income is divided by the household size to obtain the average income of
a household member. (Household income and size are included separately as robustness
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Table 1.2: Parking Prices Summary Statistics
Mean Observations
Parking Prices Among Commuters
Parking Price (including 0 prices) 0.27 5,194
(2.67)
Non-zero Parking Prices 7.8 177
(12.29)
Zipcode Average Parking Price (including 0 prices) 0.46 6,793
(2.5)
Zipcode Average Non-zero Parking Price 5.7 3,764
(8.82)
Parking Prices Among All Drivers in Sample Areas
Zipcode Average Parking Price (including 0 prices) 0.42 6,793
(2.42)
Zipcode Average Non-zero Parking Price 7.83 6,793
(7.54)
Standard errors in parentheses
checks, and the results do not change). All other variables are obtained directly from the
dataset.
Trip Characteristics
The Euclidean distance between home and work locations is constructed using the geocoded
addresses in NREL. This measure is independent of commute mode choice. Another im-
portant aspect of commute mode choice is the relative time cost of the different modes. To
account for time cost, the ratio of transit time to driving time is constructed. Transit time
and driving time are constructed by using Google Maps . The time costs are constructed
for the departure time reported by each commuter on a given weekday. The only drawback
of using Google Maps is that the time costs constructed are for the year 2017, i.e., 5 years
after the CHTS dataset. However, using Google Maps is the best option for constructing
such variables and would be a reasonable estimate of the average time cost of going from
one neighborhood to another.
Almost 20% of commuters stop somewhere else on the way to work for one reason or another.
A binary variable indicating such chain trips is created, taking the value of 1 if there is at
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least one stop on the way to work. Peak traffic time is also controlled for and is included as
a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the commuter leaves home to work during peak
traffic hours, and 0 otherwise. Peak traffic hours are defined here as weekdays 5.00 - 9.00
am and 3.00 – 7.00 pm.
Neighborhood Characteristics
Population density of both the census tract of the work location and that of home location
are controlled for, since there is evidence that people are more likely to drive to less dense
neighborhoods and from less dense neighborhoods. The density measures used are population
per square mile. Another variable of interest is the distance to the nearest transit stop and
is constructed using GIS tools for everyone whether they take transit or not. In fact, two
variables are constructed: one to indicate the distance between home and the nearest transit
station, and another to indicate the distance between work and the nearest transit station.
These variables are constructed using the geocoded locations of both individuals and transit
stations. The exact home and destination locations of individuals are available in the NREL
secured portal. The exact locations of the transit stations are obtained from several sources;
some are obtained as GIS data from the corresponding transit system or county portals,
others are obtained from a compilation of geocoded addresses of transit stations, and yet
others are digitized from maps using GIS techniques. A list of the source of the data can
be found in the appendix. GIS techniques are then used to find the distance to the nearest
transit station for each home and work location.
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1.3 Empirical Model
The decision to drive is modeled as a function of parking cost along with a large set of control
variables:
D∗i = βP ln(P
∗
i ) +Xiβx + Yiβy + ui (1.1)
Di =
 1 if D
∗
i > 0
0 if D∗i ≤ 0
(1.2)
where D∗i represents a commuter’s unobservable propensity to drive, Di is a binary variable
that takes on the value of 1 if the commuter drives and 0 otherwise, P ∗i represents the parking
price charged at the destination, ln(P ∗i ) represents the natural logarithm of the parking price
(adding 1 to avoid loss of 0 prices), Xi is a vector of socioeconomic variables, and Yi a vector
of trip-related variables and neighborhood characteristics. Yi includes variables such as trip
distance, distance to nearest transit station, transit time cost ratio, census tract population
density, time of day, and whether the trip is part of a trip-chain, among others.
The difficulties that arise for this estimation are the result of both missing prices and missing
information on EP parking and in-lieu of parking incentives. Since only 177 commuters report
paying for parking, parking prices have to be estimated for the remaining commuters. The
estimation procedure for parking prices will depend on the assumptions made about EP
parking and in-lieu of parking incentives, because such assumptions will dictate whether free
parking is truly free or whether there is a hidden opportunity cost that must be accounted
for. Therefore, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first part of the analysis, which
will be referred to as the “Free Parking Scenario”, is carried out under the assumption that
drivers who do not report parking prices indeed face a price of $0. The second part, which
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will be referred to as the “Parking Opportunity Cost Scenario”, is carried out under the
assumption that drivers who do not report parking prices all receive both EP parking and
in-lieu of parking incentives, and hence, face a non-zero opportunity cost of parking.
A potential source of bias in the estimation of βP is that commuters planning to drive
to work may be choosing jobs located in areas with no or low parking prices, or may be
choosing jobs that offer free parking. Although in principle it is possible that drivers may
be choosing jobs based on parking prices, this paper assumes that in practice it is highly
unlikely that parking prices play a significant role in job choice. In fact, it is also assumed
that, unlike residential neighborhood sorting phenomena, sorting into particular workplace
neighborhoods is highly unlikely because the neighborhood is defined at the zipcode level and
workers are unlikely to be able to choose jobs, and hence sort into workplace neighborhoods,
based on the zipcode. Although the model includes a wide array of covariates, it certainly
does not include all possible confounding variables. Therefore, a potential source of bias
emerges from the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity, and this is not accounted for in
this paper.
1.4 Free Parking Scenario
The major assumption for this part of the analysis is that drivers who do not report paying
for parking are parking for free. Therefore, parking price is always known for drivers. On
the other hand, individuals who do not drive do not report any parking price and hence
parking price is a missing variable for that group of commuters. One approach to estimate
the parking prices these non-drivers would face if driving is to compute the average parking
price in the destination zipcode and assign it to them. However, parking price is not missing
at random, but is rather missing conditional on not driving. That is, parking price is always
missing when the commuter is not driving to work, and is known only when the commuter
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drives to work. In this case imputing missing values is not straightforward. Therefore, the
following situation holds:
ln(Pi) =
 ln(P
∗
i ) if Di = 1
− if Di = 0
(1.3)
where Pi is observed parking price (and P
∗
i actual parking prices)
1. Figure 1.2 illustrates
the situations.
Figure 1.2: Free Parking Scenario
The approach followed, thus, is to model the selection and estimate parking prices given
that they are observed conditional on driving to work alone. Therefore, this approach is a
Bivariate Selection Model that can be modeled as a Type 2 Tobit model (Amemiya, 1985),
where equation 1.2 is the participation equation and equation 1.3 is the outcome equation.
The approach is discussed further below.
1The distribution of actual parking prices is not observed in its entirety; hence the distinction between
Pi and P
∗
i .
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1.4.1 Selection Model
The standard Type 2 Tobit model is one where the censored outcome variable (parking prices
- ln(Pi)) is observed conditional on a decision represented by a binary variable (the decision
to drive - Di). There is additional complexity in this paper’s model, though, arising from the
fact that the decision to drive itself is dependent on the censored outcome variable, parking
prices (as modeled in equation 1.1), and so parking prices are endogenously determined in
such a case. This issue has been addressed by Lee (1978, 1979). Details on how this works
can be found in the appendix.
Interestingly, the Likelihood Ratio test of independent equations in the Selection Model in-
dicates that the null hypothesis of independent equations cannot be rejected, which suggests
that modeling parking prices as a Type 2 Tobit model is not necessarily advantageous, and
hence, selection bias is not a valid concern for the problem at hand. Nevertheless, the esti-
mated parking prices resulting from the Selection Model are used to estimate equation 1.1,
and the results are presented in Table 1.3.
Average marginal effects are calculated by computing marginal effects for each commuter
and then averaging over all commuters. The estimates for the parking price marginal effect
beyond specification (2) decrease in magnitude gradually as more confounding variables are
controlled for, but remain negative and significant. Adding household characteristics does
not seem to impact the marginal effect of parking prices, but adding trip-related costs such
as distance and transit time cost along with distance from the work location to the nearest
transit station does. The more drastic drop in the magnitude of the estimate of the parking
price marginal effect takes place when county fixed effects are added. Based on the results
of specification (5), a 10% increase in parking prices results in a 0.74 percentage point drop
in the probability of driving to work. Further discussion will follow in section 1.6.
15
Table 1.3: Model Estimation (Selection Model)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Price) -0.194*** -0.197*** -0.165*** -0.150*** -0.074***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.031) (0.015)
ln(Income) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.021***
(0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Female -0.001 0.01 0.015 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01)
High School 0.130*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 0.090***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
College Degree -0.082*** -0.067*** -0.065*** -0.043***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
White 0.019 0.012 -0.003 -0.005
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
ln(Distance) 0.016** 0.016** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Mode Time Ratio 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*
(0) (0) (0)
Transit-Work Distance 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Transit-Home Distance 0.003*** 0.001 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Density at Work) -0.025*** -0.003
(0.009) (0.007)
ln(Density at Home) -0.022*** -0.016***
(0.007) (0.006)
Peak -0.046*** -0.043***
(0.011) (0.01)
Chain 0.017 0.034**
(0.015) (0.015)
County Fixed Effects No No No No Yes
Observations 6628 6050 5650 5503 5503
Pseudo R2 0.0334 0.0447 0.0658 0.0823 0.1549
Average Marginal Effects are reported
Average Marginal Effect of price has been adjusted to reflect that of price itself not 1+price
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the zipcode level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Estimations include a constant
16
1.4.2 Alternative Approach: Average Parking Prices
Another approach would be to ignore potential selection bias and assign non-drivers the
average parking price computed based on the parking prices of drivers in the corresponding
zipcode area. This approach is reasonable since the Likelihood Ratio test for independent
equations from the Selection Model failed to reject the null hypothesis of independent equa-
tions and, hence, no selection bias exists. Since under this approach the assumption is that
all drivers not reporting paying for parking face no opportunity cost (do not receive any
cash-out offers), and hence are facing a parking price of $0, then non-drivers are expected
to face the same probability of facing $0 because of the absence of selection bias. Therefore,
the expected value of parking prices for non-drivers is the weighted average of all the free
parking as well as the paid parking. The average parking price is then used in the estimation
of equation 1.1.
The zipcode average parking price is computed using parking prices reported by all those
who drive to the destination zipcode regardless of the trip purpose. The alternative is to
compute the zipcode average parking price using parking prices reported by commuters
only. The advantage of including all drivers regardless of trip purpose is that there are over
900 reported (positive) parking prices in such a case, relative to only 177 reported (positive)
parking prices by commuters. Basing the computations on the larger pool of reported parking
prices is likely to result in a more reliable estimate. The only advantage of using the 177
parking prices reported by commuters is that such an estimate would more likely reflect the
parking prices that are faced by commuters, which is likely to be lower than those faced
by other drivers due to possible monthly discounts or simply more familiarity with parking
options and their price ranges. Results using average parking prices based on commuters
only are also reported, but only for the preferred specification, for comparison and robustness
purposes.
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Table 1.4: Parking Price = Average Value in Zipcode
All Drivers Commuters
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Price) -0.303*** -0.296*** -0.275*** -0.265*** -0.204*** -0.176***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.013)
ln(Income) 0.016** 0.012 0.012 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female -0.001 0.009 0.012 0.004 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
High School 0.112*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
College Degree -0.057*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.032*** -0.037***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
White 0.012 0.011 0 -0.001 -0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
ln(Distance) 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Mode Time Ratio 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Transit-Work Distance 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Transit-Home Distance 0.002** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Density at Work) -0.01 0 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(Density at Home) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Peak -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Chain 0.013 0.025* 0.028**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
County Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 6793 6050 5650 5503 5503 5503
Pseudo R2 0.1442 0.1473 0.1572 0.1684 0.2049 0.1949
Average Marginal Effects are reported
Average Marginal Effect of price has been adjusted to reflect that of price itself not 1+price
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the zipcode level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Estimations include a constant
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Results are reported in Table 1.4. The specifications are identical to the ones described for
Table 1.3. Specification (6) corresponds to the average parking prices based on commuters
only. The results are very much in line with those in Table 1.3. Marginal effects of parking
prices are consistently negative and significant at the 1% significance level.
1.5 Parking Opportunity Cost Scenario
The second major issue is the unobservability of whether EP parking is offered, and if
so, whether any incentive to give it up is being offered as well. Many employers provide
free parking to their employees as a fringe benefit, which would typically come out of all
employees’ wages. Nevertheless, as long as the employee is not offered the choice between
free parking and equivalent cash, parking will be perceived as free due to the lack of incentive
to change the commute mode, i.e., the opportunity cost of parking is zero.
On the other hand, if an employee is offered some sort of incentive to change his commute
mode, then the resulting opportunity cost must be regarded as the price of parking. In-
centives could take the form of transit subsidies, carpooling subsidies, or cash-out programs
where the employee is offered the choice to receive the cash equivalent of the parking price
(or the portion of parking price paid by the employer if not fully subsidized) in lieu of free
parking. If incentives are provided, then the value of the incentive is the opportunity cost of
parking and thus should be set as the parking price. Because no information on incentives
is available in the dataset, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the following 3
groups of drivers:
• Drivers who are not provided parking by employers: the observed parking price is
correct.
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• Drivers who have EP parking but are not offered an incentive: the observed parking
price is correct, and the parking price should be set to zero.
• Drivers who have EP parking and are also offered an incentive: parking price should
be set to the value of the incentive foregone.
This is further illustrated in Figure 1.3. For this part of the analysis, the opportunity cost
of free parking is assumed to be equal to the prevalent parking price in the neighborhood.
All those who drive and do not report paying for parking are assumed to have been offered
both EP parking and incentive programs. Similarly, non-drivers are also assumed to have
been offered incentive programs. This implies that whether parking prices are observed is
no longer conditional on driving, and all missing parking prices and all free parking are
equivalent. This is an extreme case since in practice only some commuters will be offered
such incentives and not everyone as assumed here. An average parking price is computed
for each zipcode area, where only positive parking prices are included in the computation,
and is then used in the estimation of the model presented by equations 1.1 and 1.2.
Figure 1.3: Parking Opportunity Cost Scenario
20
The difference between the average parking price computed in this section and the one
computed in the previous section is that here only positive parking prices are averaged
and $0 parking prices are dropped from the computation. This method corresponds to the
assumption that no one enjoys free parking and everyone is facing a parking opportunity
cost, and so for those who do not report paying for parking and those who do not drive, the
expected value of the parking price they are likely to face is the average of that actually paid
in the destination zipcode.
The zipcode average price is again computed twice, once based on the commuter parking
price only, and another time based on prices paid by anyone parking at the destinations of
interest regardless of the trip purpose. Using the latter computation becomes even more
advantageous in this part of the analysis because of the structure of the sample. Doing so
enables us to compute positive zipcode average parking prices, although commuters are not
observed paying for parking there, which increases the sample size. Table 1.5 presents the
results.
The results correspond to average parking prices based on the pool of all drivers, and only
specification (6) correspond to parking prices based on commuters only. Results are still in
line with the previous ones, revealing a negative significant impact of parking prices on the
decision to drive to work. A 10% increase in parking prices results in a 1 percentage point
reduction in the probability of driving to work. The marginal effect of parking prices is much
lower in absolute value than the estimate obtained using average prices in the first part of
the analysis. Further discussion of the results is presented in the following section.
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Table 1.5: Parking Price = Average Non-Zero Price
All Drivers Commuters
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Price) -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.127*** -0.122*** -0.104*** -0.140***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) (0.016)
ln(Income) 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.021*** 0.016
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Female -0.016 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014)
High School 0.119*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.092*** 0.04
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.042)
College Degree -0.083*** -0.070*** -0.066*** -0.044*** -0.042**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020)
White 0.01 0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
ln(Distance) 0.019*** 0.019** 0.025*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Mode Time Ratio 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Transit-Work Distance 0.005*** 0.003* 0.005*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Transit-Home Distance 0.002** 0.001 -0.001 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(Density at Work) -0.024*** -0.005 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
ln(Density at Home) -0.016** -0.013*** -0.008
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Peak -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Chain 0.022 0.036** 0.024
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
County Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 6793 6050 5650 5503 5503 2970
Pseudo R2 0.0825 0.0924 0.1104 0.1255 0.1904 0.2611
Average Marginal Effects are reported
Average Marginal Effect of price has been adjusted to reflect that of price itself not 1+price
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the zipcode level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Estimations include a constant
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1.6 Discussion
Overall, parking prices have a significant impact on the decision to drive, and the results are
robust to the inclusion of various control variables and their variations and to the estimation
under various assumptions. The two estimation approaches presented in sections 1.4 and
1.5 present extreme scenarios, and therefore the true impact of parking prices is expected
to lie within the range produced. The model estimated under the “Free Parking Scenario”
correctly predicts the decision to drive 82.4% of the time whereas the model under the
“Parking Opportunity Cost Scenario” does so 81.3% of the time.
The average marginal effects for the preferred specification (Specification (5)) for the “Free
Parking Scenario” and the “Parking Opportunity Cost Scenario” are -0.2 and -0.1 respec-
tively. The findings suggest that increasing the parking price by 10% leads to a decrease of
the probability to drive to work somewhere between 1 and 2 percentage points. The esti-
mates indicate the extent to which parking prices can be used as an effective transportation
demand management tool. The marginal effects vary with prices and the relationship is not
a linear one. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 depict the relationship between marginal effects and prices
under the different scenarios. The figures illustrate how effective raising parking prices are
depending on the initial prices. For example, a 10% increase in parking prices results in a
drop in the probability of driving by 1.1 – 2.8 percentage points if the parking prices are
initially $5, and a drop by 1.2 – 2.1 percentage points if the parking prices are initially $10.
Elimination of free parking or raising the prices of underpriced parking thus have the po-
tential to reduce vehicle usage on commute trips. The findings also suggest that offering
incentives to give up EP parking, such as cash-out programs, would also reduce driving
alone to work. An elimination or a reduction of EP parking would reduce driving alone
to work as well. However, offering cash-out alternatives and the elimination of EP parking
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will have the anticipated effect only if parking in the workplace neighborhood is not free of
charge.
Figure 1.4: Free Parking Scenario
Figure 1.5: Parking Opportunity Cost Scenario
The model also explains how other covariates impact the decision to drive. The estimates
and significance for these variables seem to be consistent over all specifications . Under all
approaches higher income seems to increase the probability of driving, as does age. Race
and gender, on the other hand, do not seem to influence the probability of driving to work.
The effect of education varies, depending on the level of education. High School graduates
drive more, whereas college degree holders tend to drive less.
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The distance between home and work is significant, indicating that commuters tend to drive
more the farther away they live from work. Moreover, the greater the ratio of transit time
to driving time, the more likely driving is. These results are all intuitive.
The distance between the work location and the nearest transit station is significant, indi-
cating that the farther away a transit station is from the work location the more likely a
commuter is to drive. The same effect is present for the distance between home and the near-
est transit station, but is significant only in the specification (3). Once population density is
controlled for the effect disappears. The findings for transit station distance is in line with
those of Kwoka et al. (2015) for Denver, where proximity to transit at the work location
is more important than proximity at home. Population density is significant and indicates,
as the literature suggests, that higher population densities encourage alternative commute
mode choices. The effect of population density at the work location disappears, however,
once county fixed effects are controlled for.
Whether the work trip is part of a chain trip, and whether departure time from home is during
peak hours are both significant and indicate that commuters are more likely to drive if they
have another stop to make on the way to work, and are less likely to drive if they depart
during rush hours. Although the effect of these variables is intuitive, they may seem to be
prone to an endogeneity problem since they are choice variables. Therefore, it may be argued
that people may choose the time of departure based on their travel mode choice, or that they
may make additional stops on the way to work just because they have the car. Moreover,
since departure time and number of stops on the way to work are choice variables, they both
may be driven by unobserved heterogeneity. However, since the study is limited to work
commutes, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of commuters are not very flexible
with the time of departure to work. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the majority
of commuters will not make additional stops on the way to work just because they have the
car. Commuters tend to be rushing to work, or are on a tight schedule and are unlikely to
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squeeze in unnecessary stops just because of their chosen mode of transportation. Generally
speaking, it is reasonable to argue that for work commutes, departure time and stops on the
way to work are typically not flexible choices and therefore may not be susceptible to typical
concerns associated with choice variables. At any rate, the variables are not of focus in this
paper and are only used for control purposes and do not seem to affect the robustness of the
results for parking prices.
1.7 Conclusion
This study examines the impact of parking prices on the decision to drive to work in Califor-
nia, and finds a statistically significant impact. The study offers different approaches to the
estimation of parking prices that are unobserved conditional on not driving, i.e., are unob-
served for non-drivers. The paper also raises the question of the impact of incentive packages
offered to encourage drivers to switch to an alternative mode; in particular, incentives offered
in lieu of parking. The analysis offers a way to address such a concern, and deals with the
extreme case of assuming that everyone is offered some form of incentive. The estimates ob-
tained thus provide a range of average marginal effects in which the true marginal effect lies,
and suggest that a 10% increase in parking prices could potentially reduce the probability
of driving alone to work by 1 - 2 percentage points.
The results imply that parking pricing policies can be effective transportation demand man-
agement tools, yet the effectiveness will vary depending on the initial parking price charged.
Charging the market price for parking can reduce vehicle usage, leading to less traffic con-
gestion, energy consumption, and pollution. Moreover, the results suggest that elimination
of EP parking, or offering incentives in lieu of parking, can be effective in reducing driving
to work alone, as long as the parking prices in the workplace neighborhoods are positive.
A major limitation of the paper is that the dataset is cross-sectional, limiting our ability
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to learn more about the dynamics of the effectiveness of parking policies over time. It also
limits the ability to address identification threats adequately. Future research could improve
on the estimation of parking prices by collecting actual parking data and matching it to the
work locations of commuters. Furthermore, future research could extend the binary analysis
to mode choice analysis, exploring the effects of parking prices on the alternative commute
modes, and not only on the decision to drive.
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Chapter 2
Commute Mode Choices and the Role
of Parking Prices, Parking
Availability and Urban Form:
Evidence from Los Angeles County
2.1 Introduction
There is growing evidence that inexpensive or free parking is a major incentive for solo driving
[Willson and Shoup, 1990; Willson, 1992; Hess, 2001; Shoup, 2005]. When commuters are
shielded from the cost of parking, they drive alone more often, frustrating public policy goals
to reduce solo driving. This implies that employer-paid parking, a popular fringe benefit,
incentivizes workers to drive to work alone. By directly or indirectly subsidizing parking,
employers reduce the cost of the commute trip by car while requiring the employee to pay only
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the driving cost. Thus, parking subsidies at the workplace can work at cross purposes with
public policies designed to reduce traffic congestion, energy consumption, and air pollution.
In addition, all car trips start and end in a parking space. When parking is scarce or hard to
find at either or both ends of a trip, the relative advantage of transit exceeds the advantages
of automobile use. There is evidence that guaranteed off-street parking at home also results
in a larger share of car owners choosing to drive to work, even in areas that are well served
by public transit (Weinberger, 2012). Zoning regulations that require residential buildings
to include off-street parking for some or all residents therefore contribute to increases in
driving to work [Weinberger et al., 2008a;2008b; 2009] and to losses in urban green spaces.
In fact, the additional off-street parking required by residential parking minima comes often
at the expense of green space, as front and rear yards are converted to alleys or driveways
to accommodate vehicles. Moreover, parking can influence destination choice, trip timing,
and car occupancy [Feeney, 1989; Inci, 2015], as well as car ownership [Guo, 2013a; 2013b].
A good understanding of how parking costs and different types of parking availability at
both ends of a trip affect commute mode choices is thus necessary if a shift away from the
private car towards more sustainable methods of transport is to be achieved. Comprehension
of such a matter will result in the development of appropriate land use planning strategies
and infrastructure provision to increase the use of sustainable transport modes (e.g., public
transport, walking and cycling) to places of employment.
In this paper we study the work commute mode-choice effects of the interactions of parking
price, parking space availability (both at work and at home locations), and urban form, in
Los Angeles County. We split our analysis into three research questions. First, we explore
how parking prices, parking space availability, and urban form jointly affect the decision to
drive. We use a conditional binary logit model to estimate the effects of the factors of interest.
Second, we explore how parking prices, parking space availability, and urban form jointly
affect the commuting mode choice, where commute mode choice is broken down to three
29
alternatives: driving, public transit, and non-motorized. This question is addressed using
a conditional multinomial logit model. Third, we predict the response of the probability
of driving to work to changes in parking prices, and parking space availability, while also
examining the effect of simultaneously changing parking prices and other variables of interest.
Los Angeles County offers a good setup to study our questions. Los Angeles is widely
recognized for its automobile dependence and issues associated with traffic congestion, which
may be due to the decentralized nature of the county’s density along freeway corridors
(Sorensen et al., 2008). Los Angeles County currently has more lane-miles of arterials,
highways, and interstates per square mile than any other US metro area (Federal Highway
Statistics, 2013). However, the area occupied by roads is only a fraction of the land devoted
to automobiles, since the total land area dedicated to on- and off-street parking is 40% larger
than the 140 square miles dedicated to the roadway system (Chester et al., 2015). Manville
and Shoup (2005) find that Los Angeles County offers more abundant and free parking
than many other cities in the United States. This infrastructure is scattered throughout the
metropolitan area in on-street parking spaces and off-street parking lots and structures.
Our results suggest that parking prices are an important determinant of commute mode
choice to work in Los Angeles County. Parking prices have a significant negative impact
on the decision to drive to work, and our analysis indicates that a 10% increase in park-
ing prices may decrease the probability of driving to work by 1.1%. The multinomial logit
results indicate further that higher parking prices shift people away from driving alone to
using public transit and non-motorized modes. Another interesting finding is that parking
space availability at home, both off-street and on-street, increases the probability of driv-
ing to work. On-street parking availability at home, however, seems to matter more than
residential off-street parking availability at home, since a 10% increase in on-street parking
would increase the probability of driving by 1.3% whereas a similar increase in residential
off-street parking would increase the probability of driving by only 0.6%.
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Our evidence thus suggests that parking pricing can be an effective transportation demand
management tool, and that elimination of employer-paid parking and provision of in-lieu
parking subsidies can reduce driving to work. Moreover, parking space availability at home
cannot be overlooked in parking policy decisions. Based on our analyses, it is evident that
removal of minimum parking requirements may help reduce vehicle usage. The remainder
of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 starts with a brief literature review looking
at the link between land use, parking charges, parking availability and mode choice. Section
2.3 outlines the empirical framework which is then followed by a description of the data
used, the data sampling processes, and the selected variables. Section 2.4 discusses the
estimated results, while section 2.5 discusses the predictions produced by our model. Finally,
a conclusion wraps up the paper, with special attention given to the practical implications
of our research.
2.2 Literature Review
The literature on land use, parking pricing and availability, and mode choice is vast. This
section provides a brief review of the main elements of these research streams which have
been studied using different approaches, cities, and data sources.
Parking costs have been shown to be an important factor in travel mode choice. For example,
Willson and Shoup (1990) review empirical studies of car parking subsidies and find that
eliminating free car parking at work reduces single-occupancy vehicle commuting between
19% and 81%. Another study examining parking subsidies in Los Angeles finds that between
25% and 34% fewer automobiles were driven to workplaces when workers had to pay to park
their cars (Willson, 1992). Shoup (1997b) reviewed the effects of “cash out” programs
and finds that single-occupancy vehicle commuting fell by 17% among employees in eight
case study firms after they complied with California’s cash-out requirement. An analysis
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of parking subsidies in Portland, Oregon, estimated that a daily car parking charge of $6
reduced single-occupancy vehicle commuting by 16% (Hess, 2001), whereas Khordagui (2017)
finds that a 10% increase in parking prices reduces the probability of driving to work by 1 -
2 percentage points, depending on whether in-lieu of parking packages are offered.
There are also studies that have examined how parking space availability in workplace and
residential settings affect work commute mode choices. While parking space availability at
employment sites has attracted considerable research efforts for decades (Inci, 2015), parking
space availability at home sites, has recently become subject to increasing research interest
[Christiansen et al., 2017; Guo, 2013b; Marsden, 2006; Weinberger, 2012]. The association
between features of the built environment at the employment site or residence and commute
choices has also been studied by several researchers. Examples include Cervero (2018, 1996),
Kockelman (1995), Messenger and Ewing (1996), Cervero and Wu (1997), Levtnson and
Kumar (1997), Ewing and Cervero (2001), and Ewing and Cervero (2010). In general, land
use characteristics have been found to significantly impact mode choice decisions.
A central challenge for empirical analyses of parking and car use is access to sufficient
amount of valid and reliable data. Most prior research depended on a limited number of
case study areas [Weinberger et al., 2008b; Transport for London, 2012], manual observations
[Christiansen and Hanssen, 2014; Hanssen et al., 2014], stated preference surveys (Guo
and McDonnell, 2013) and parking revenue data (Kobus et al., 2013). A few studies have
combined different data sources, such as residential prices and residential parking zones (van
Ommeren et al., 2011) or, household travel data and parking information retrieved using
Google Street View (Guo, 2013b).
Our work contributes to this existing literature by investigating the impact of parking strate-
gies (parking charges and parking space availability at employment and residence sites) on
work trip mode choice, using a rich dataset for Los Angeles County: the household travel
data from the 2012 California Household Travel Survey (CHTS), parking prices retrieved
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using a unique dataset on commercial parking facilities for the Southern California Associa-
tion of Governments (SCAG) region, and parking availability from a dataset on on-street and
off-street parking in LA County. We also explore the disincentive effects for auto-commuting
of daily parking charges with secured parking space at work under alternative urban forms
and residential parking space availability scenarios. Moreover, our conditional binomial and
multinomial logit models allow us to jointly identify both commuter and travel mode specific
effects on the commute mode choice.
Modeling of mode choice is done by means of a discrete choice model. Most of the mode
choice studies have used binary and multinomial logit models. However, the conditional logit
regression model, known as McFadden’s choice model, is also well suited for the work-trip
travel mode choice framework because it exploits detailed information on transport modes
while allowing for multiple mode choices. While the form of the likelihood function of the
conditional logit is similar to that of the unconditional logit, the variables of the conditional
logit are choice-specific attributes rather than individual-specific characteristics. Therefore,
variation in the attributes of the transport modes in a commuter’s choice set drives the
estimates. Our conditional logit model builds on McFadden’s conditional logit but is more
general as it allows for the two types of independent variables: mode-specific and commuter-
specific variables. Mode-specific variables vary across both individuals and travel modes,
whereas commuter-specific variables vary only across individuals.
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2.3 Data and Selected Variables
2.3.1 Probabilistic Choice Model
The first discrete choice framework models the decision to drive as follows:
D∗i = βPPi +SPACEiβSP +URBANiβURB +HHiβHH +TiβT +Zijγ+ ui (2.1)
Di =
 1 if D
∗
i > 0
0 if D∗i ≤ 0
(2.2)
where D∗i represents a commuter’s unobservable propensity to drive, and Di is a binary
variable that takes the value of 1 if the commuter drives alone or carpools and 0 otherwise. Pi
represents the daily parking price, SPACEi represents the various parking space measures,
URBANi is a vector of urban form measures, HHi is a vector of household controls, Ti
is a vector of trip characteristics, and Zij is the speed of the alternative travel modes. We
estimate equation 2.2 as a conditional binary logit model, where Pi, SPACEi, URBANi,
HHi and Ti, are commuter-specific, i.e., vary across individuals (i), and Zij is mode-specific,
i.e., vary across travel modes (j) for each individual.
Next, we examine the impact of our explanatory variables on the choice of three travel modes,
in a conditional multinomial logit framework. Typically, we would like to explore the effects
on driving alone, public transit, carpooling, non-motorized, and passenger. However, due to
the small number of observations of both carpooling and passenger groups in our sample,
we cannot rely on estimates of such a model. Therefore, we limit our next analysis to the
subsample where there are only three mode choice alternatives: drive alone, public transit
or active commute such as walking or biking. In the model presented below, driving alone
is treated as the reference mode. As such, our second mode choice framework models the
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commute mode decision as follows:
M∗i = βPPi +SPACEiβSP +URBANiβURB +HHiβHH +TiβT +Zijγ+ ui (2.3)
Mi =

1 if DriveAlone
2 if Transit
3 if Non−motorized
(2.4)
and M∗i is the unobserved propensity of mode choice.
2.3.2 Data Sources
Commute mode choice, socioeconomic characteristics, and trip-related characteristics are
obtained from the 2012 California Household Travel Survey (CHTS). The 2012 CHTS dataset
is a cross-sectional dataset that includes 42,431 households from all over California and is
obtained from the Transportation Secure Data Center of the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL). Addresses are provided at the census tract level in the public use
dataset, but we are able to work with geocoded addresses available in the NREL secured
data portal. We limit our dataset to Los Angeles County commuters, looking at work trips
that start and end within the county. We also limit our study to households that have at
least one vehicle.
The 2012 CHTS has data on whether the commuter pays for parking at work if driving, and
the amount paid. However, two major drawbacks emerge when dealing with the 2012 CHTS
reported parking prices. First, those who do not drive to work do not report on parking
prices and, therefore, the parking price they would have paid had they driven is unobservable.
Second, the 2012 CHTS does not provide information on whether the commuter receives
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employer-paid parking and whether an in-lieu of parking subsidy, such as a cash-out program,
is offered. Therefore, we do not observe whether the reported free parking is indeed free or
conceals an unobserved opportunity cost of parking. To address such concerns, we make
some assumptions.
We assume that all commuters failing to report a positive parking price are in fact facing
some cost of parking, that is, we assume that they are offered both employer-paid parking
and in-lieu-of-parking subsidies. This will provide conservative estimates for the effect of a
daily parking price on mode choice because we assume that all those who drive to work face
a parking charge, which may not necessarily be the case. In addition, we proxy daily parking
charges with the work subarea market average price paid for parking.
To calculate our parking charge measure we use a unique dataset that provides data on
market parking prices and parking supply at commercial off-street parking facilities that
are open to the public in the SCAG region. This dataset is constructed from field work
and information from websites such as Parkopedia, BestParking, Parkme, LADOT, and the
ie511 to account for commercial parking spaces open to the public in each census tract and
for market parking prices. Market parking prices vary depending on location, since parking
facility costs are based on land costs, which itself varies. Costs are likely higher toward central
business districts, where land values are higher, and lower in suburban areas. Additional
sources, such as press articles, the Yellow Pages, and local government’s websites, are also
used in the compilation of these parking data. Further investigations were carried out for
some of the parking facilities through on-site inspections, phone calls, or Google Street View
for either clarifications or validation purposes. More information on the parking facilities
dataset can be found in Franco (2016b).
We geocode the addresses of all the identified commercial off-street parking facilities and
match them to the commuter’s work location from 2012 CHTS using GIS techniques. The
weighted average parking price within a radius of the work location is then computed for
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of Parking Prices Calculation
each commuter using the daily price charged and the number of parking spaces in each of
the parking facilities located within the work subarea.
Since data on the search time and walking time for parking are also not available, we assume
that a commuter would not walk more than 10 minutes from a parking location to the
workplace. This corresponds to a half mile radius around the employment site. As such, the
weighted average market price for parking within a half-mile radius of the work location is
calculated and used to measure the price disincentive to driving (acknowledging nevertheless
that there may be different tradeoffs between cost and walking time that are not measured).
This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
As shown in Figure 2.1, only parking facilities located within the half-mile buffer are consid-
ered when calculating the weighted average parking price. Commuters who report positive
parking prices on the 2012 CHTS are assigned their reported parking prices. On the other
hand, all those who report free parking or do not report paying for parking or do not report
what their parking cost would have been had they driven to work, are assigned our matched
weighted average market parking price.
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Parking availability of on-street and off-street parking at the origin (home) and destination
(employment site) of the work trip are calculated based on the 2010 parking supply census
tract data for Los Angeles County assembled by Chester et al. (2015).
Finally, we use the countywide zoning and the Los Angeles census tract GIS shapefiles,
available from the Los Angeles County GIS Data Portal, to construct our land use mix
measure at employment sites. The dataset includes zoning codes for each city, their general
plan codes, and a generalized general plan code developed by SCAG to support regional
analysis.
Because we restrict our sample to observations for which there are no missing values and to
those where a half-mile radius average parking price can be computed, our final sample for
the analysis includes 927 individual home-based work trips.
In the first part of the analysis, where we investigate the binary decision of whether to drive,
both solo drivers and carpoolers are grouped in the driving group. Drivers comprise 79.6%
of the sample (1.3% are carpoolers whereas 78.3% are solo drivers). Transit users, those who
use non-motorized means, and others are grouped in the alternative group. Transit riders
comprise 11.4% of the full sample, whereas the non-motorized commuters represent 6.5%.
When we move to the multinomial analysis part, we have tighter definitions for the commute
modes, where the first group now comprises only solo drivers, the second group comprises of
transit users, and the third group includes non-motorized or active commuting users. The
carpoolers and those using other commute modes are dropped in this part of the analysis
because there are too few observations to comprise a group. We further note that a commuter
is grouped in the transit class as long as public transit is part of the commute trip. Therefore,
commuters who park and drive are also included in the public transit group. The non-
motorized class includes commuters who take an active commute such as walking and cycling.
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of driving commuters
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Average Parking Prices at workplace census tract
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Figure 2.2 shows the census tracts of Los Angeles County and the percentage of commuters
driving to work in our sample. The color gradient represent tracts where these commuters
work. Figure 2.3, on the other hand, shows the distribution of average parking prices assigned
to commuters in our sample.
2.3.3 Discussion of Selected Variables
Parking Charges
Table 2.1 shows that the average reported daily parking price paid among those who drive
and pay for parking is $8.39. Yet, only 5.18% of those who drove to work reported paying
for parking. This is not surprising given that a large number of LA employers provide free
parking as a fringe benefit to their employees (Shoup, 2005). Our average constructed daily
parking price is $11.95.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Parking Variables
Full Sample Drive Not drive
Parking Charges
Drivers Reported Paying for Parking (%) 5.18
Average Reported Daily Parking Price ($) 8.39
Average Constructed Daily Parking Price ($) 11.95 11.5 13.62
Parking Availability
Average Nonresidential Off-street Parking Spaces 50,240 45,340 68,747
for Work Tract (per square mile)
Average On-street Parking Spaces 4,360 4,345 4,418
for Home Tract (per square mile)
Average Residential Off-street Parking Spaces 4,091 3,982 4,502
for Home Tract (per square mile)
Parking Availability
Our parking space availability measures include three types of parking supply variables: the
number of non-residential off-street parking spaces at the work census tract, the number
of on-street parking spaces available at the residence census tract, and the number of non-
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residential off-street parking spaces at the residence census tract. On-street parking spaces
refer to both metered and unmetered parking spaces at the curbside. Non-residential off-
street parking spaces refer to both parking lots and parking structures, whereas residential
off-street parking spaces refer to driveways, and parking garages allotted for residential use.
The natural logarithms of these variables are used in the conditional logit regression.
Parking availability variables can be proxies for parking convenience at origin and destination
locations. Different types of parking (on-street versus off-street) can be used as proxies for
parking certainty to a household. For instance, for residential on-street parking, certainty
is reflected by the combination of search time and distance between parking location and
home, which may vary by time of day and week. For residential off-street parking, parking
certainty may depend on the agreement between the landlord and the tenants. However,
when a household chooses a commute mode, the household considers parking certainty from
all available parking options at the residence location, not just the one they eventually use.
Parking location (on-site, off-street and on-street) can also proxy for parking ease, assuming
each location has a set of parking features. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of those who
park for free and those who pay to park by parking location type.
Table 2.2: Workplace Parking Location
Location of Parking for Drivers Who: On-site On-street Off-street
Pay to park 0% 13.70% 86.30%
Do not report paying 80% 6% 12.50%
As shown in Table 2.2, 80% of those who drive yet do not report paying for parking park
on-site as opposed to parking on-street or off-street at a commercial lot or garage. Most
of those who pay to park (86.3%) are parking off-street. It should be noted, however, that
our model neither predicts commuters’ choice of parking location, nor controls for parking
location. We do not control for parking location because this information is missing for
non-drivers.
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A rich set of additional covariates capturing other features of the commuting cost, urban form
and commuter’s characteristics are included in our analysis to control for other factors that
affect mode choice. Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics for the urban form variables
of interest, whereas 2.4 provides descriptive statistics for both household and trip-related
controls.
Table 2.3: Urban Form Summary Statistics (Mean)
Full Sample Drive Not drive
Land Use Mix Measure
Herfindahl Index 0.25 0.25 0.26
Public Transit Accessibility Measures
Distance Between Home Location and 1.37 1.4 1.3
Nearest Rail Transit Station (miles)
Distance Between Work Location and 0.97 1 0.85
Nearest Rail Transit Station (miles)
Total Distance to Nearest Rail Transit Station (miles) 2.34 2.4 2.15
Density Measures
Population Density for Work Tract (Person / Sq.Mile) 11,673 11,477 12,413
Population Density for Home Tract (Person / Sq.Mile) 12,362 11,651 15,048
Job Density for Work Tract (Person / Sq.Mile) 60,035 50,785 94,969
Job Density for Home Tract (Person / Sq.Mile) 4,365 3,946 5,947
Urban Form Variables
As shown in Table 2.3, our urban form measures belong to three categories: land use mix,
public transit accessibility and density. The first category comprises a land use mix diversity
variable calculated as a Herfindahl index (HHI). The index is the sum of squares of the
proportion of different component parts. If there is only one land use type present in an
area, HHI will equal 1, and if all land use types are equally present, then HHI =
1
k
, with k
equal to the number of land use types. Therefore, the higher values of HHI correspond to
less land use mix. The HHI is symmetric with respect to land uses and sensitive to the size
of the most prevalent land use.
The second category of urban form measures represents public transit accessibility. In the
analyses that follow, we use total distance to the nearest rail transit station. This is calcu-
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lated as the sum of the distance from residence to the nearest rail transit station and the
distance from the workplace to the nearest rail transit station. The rationale for this ap-
proach is that a commuter would typically think of rail accessibility as the total distance that
needs to be traveled to and from the rail station, rather than the separate accessibility from
home or from work. The separate rail transit distance variables are also used for robustness
checks. The two distance variables are constructed using GIS tools, the geocoded addresses
of residences and workplaces from the secured 2012 CHTS dataset, and the geocoded ad-
dresses of rail stations obtained from the LA Metro website. The two variables represent the
distance in bins of 0.05 miles, and are top-coded at 1.5 miles. As shown in Table 2.3, the
average distance between residence and the nearest rail transit station is 1.37 miles, whereas
the distance between the work site and the nearest rail transit station is 0.97 miles. Both
average distances tend to be slightly longer for drivers than those using an alternative mode.
Density is the last land use measure included in our model specification. Density reflects how
intensively land is used for housing, employment, and other uses. We construct population
density (per square-mile in the residence census tract) and job density (per square-mile in
the work census tract) using data from the Census Bureau (American Community Survey).
Residential population density could also relate to differences in street connectivity and
urban design [Saelens et al., 2003; Ewing and Cervero, 2010].
In our robustness checks, we also use a dummy variable denoted as ‘CBD’ which takes the
value 1 if the census tract is classified as a CBD and 0 otherwise. This variable is intended
to capture whether a commuter lives and/or works in a CBD as opposed to the urban and
inner suburbs. As such, this variable is constructed for both residence and work census
tracts. The designation of a particular census tract as ‘CBD’ resulted from the overlap of
two layers using GIS techniques: a map layer with the classification of 99 zones of the SCAG
region as CBD, urban and suburbs (Franco, 2016a), and a census tract layer1.
1Franco (2016a) classified 99 zones of the SCAG region as CBD, urban and suburbs based on the square
foot land values for each zone given by Zhang and Arnott (2011). The square foot values were used to
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Household and Commuter Specific Characteristics
Our work trip data was matched with the appropriate demographic characteristics of the
individual pursuing the trip and his/her household. The commuter characteristic variables
are based on the socio-economic-demographic data reported by the respondents in the 2012
CHTS. These variables include household income, age (in years), gender (1=female) and race
(1= white). The average annual household income is $97,782 and the average household size
is 3 persons. All households in our sample are car owners, with the average number of
vehicles in the household equal to 2 cars 2. The median commuter age is 44 years. The
sample is composed of 46% females, and 62% white commuters. We interact the income and
household size measures to get a single variable representing income per household member,
which has an average value of $41,755.
Other Work-trip related Characteristics
We distinguish between vehicle running costs and parking costs. We calculate the vehicle
running money costs by multiplying gas prices by driving distance divided by 22 miles-per-
gallon. Driving distance is calculated as the distance travelled in miles from the home census
tract centroid to the workplace census tract centroid (using Google Maps API). Gas prices
are computed as the lowest price of the home and workplace zipcodes gasoline prices. The
zipcode gasoline prices are calculated as the average of the gas price charged at the three
calculate per acre values, which were then used to make the classifications. Zones with per acre land values
less than $500,000 were listed as suburban, zones with per acre land values of $500,000 to less than $3,000,000
were listed as urban, and zones with per acre land values of $3,000,000 and above were listed as CBD.
2Most studies of the determinants of mode choice identify income and car ownership as important
drivers in mode choice, though both variables are closely correlated. Increasing incomes make owning and
maintaining a car feasible and also increase the opportunity costs of travel time making faster travel modes,
such as the car, more attractive. However, some studies speculate that socio-economic factors may be less
important in developed countries, where most households own a car (Lipps and Kunert, 2005). This suggests
that demographic variables, such as household composition, gender, and age may be more important drivers
of mode choice in wealthy countries. In addition, auto ownership is an endogenous variable. Given that all
households in our sample are car owners we have not included this variable explicitly in the analysis. Yet
our models in a sense capture a worker’s work choice of mode conditional on auto ownership.
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Table 2.4: Household and Trip Summary Statistics (Mean)
Full Sample Drive Not Drive
Household Characteristics
Household Income ($) 97,782 100,777 86,468
Household Size 3 3 3
Household income per person ($) 41,755 43,273 36,019
Age 44 45 43
Female (%) 0.46 0.46 0.47
White (%) 0.62 0.62 0.63
Trip Characteristics
Distance from home to work (miles) 18.23 20.02 11.37
Running Cost ($) 1.97 2.02 1.76
Speed of drive mode (miles/hr) 29.6 30.07 27.79
Speed of transit mode (miles/hr) 9.84 9.9 9.58
Rush Hour (%) 0.57 0.56 0.62
nearest gas stations within each zipcode provided by gasbuddy.com. We assume an average
miles-per-gallon of 22 in our computation of the running cost.
We also include the distance between home and work locations. The CHTS 2012 reports
for each commuter the distance traveled on each trip. However, this measure would be
unsuitable for our use because it is a function of the travel mode. Instead, we use the
straight-line distance between the home and work geocoded addresses in its logarithmic
form. This variable is independent of mode choice, and is used to measure how far the work
location is, instead of the actual distance traveled.
Another covariate is the time of departure. We construct a binary variable ‘peak’ that takes
the value of 1 if the commuter leaves home to work during peak traffic hours, and 0 otherwise.
Peak traffic hours are defined as weekdays from 5.00 - 9.00 am and 3.00 – 7.00 pm.
We also control for the speed of the commute mode, which is constructed by dividing the
distance traveled by the trip duration. The 2012 CHTS includes data on the actual duration
of the trip. However, this is not a measure that we would be able to use because, like
trip distance, it is a function of the mode choice. Therefore, we construct travel distances
and trip durations from Google Maps API. The preferred method would be to use the
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geocoded addresses of home and workplace locations to compute the individual travel mode
times. However, this is not possible because such data are secured and cannot be used with
internet access, and so we resort to using the centroid of the relevant tracts which are publicly
available. Travel mode speeds are constructed for the commute modes of interest. In the
binary analysis, transit speed is used for the non-driving commute mode alternative, and in
the multinomial analysis the bicycling speed is used for the non-motorized mode. This way,
the convenience of each mode is accounted for in the analysis. The average speed for the
driving mode is 29.6 miles per hour, as shown in Table 2.4, and that for transit is 9.8 miles
per hour. These speeds factor in traffic, as well as the waiting time or access time in the
public transit mode case.
2.4 Estimation Results
The results of our estimated conditional logit models are presented in Tables 2.5 (the binomial
model) and 2.6 (the multinomial model). For ease of interpretation, we present the results as
odds ratios and elasticities. The odds ratio gives the proportionate change in the relative risk
of choosing a given alternative. In the case of our multinomial logit model, they represent the
likelihood of choosing to commute by public transportation or active commuting (walking or
cycling) relative to the base category of driving, while controlling for other variables in the
analysis. An odds ratio greater than 1 implies that an increase in the explanatory variable
increases the likelihood that Y=1 and, vice-versa.
2.4.1 Conditional binary logit: to drive or not to drive?
We first examine the choice between driving and not driving, where driving refers to solo
drivers and carpoolers and non-drivers to transit riders, non-motorized mode commuters,
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and other mode users. Results are presented in Table 2.5. As one would expect, an increase
in any of the mode cost attributes reduces the chances of that mode being chosen for the
commute to work. Parking and running costs have the largest effect of the cost attributes
on mode choice. However, between the two, running cost has a relatively smaller effect on
the likelihood of driving. The odds ratios for the daily parking price and parking space
availability are particularly revealing when addressing questions of public policy. The model
produces a significant odds ratio for the daily parking price variable which is less than 1,
indicating that raising a commuter’s daily parking price at work decreases the likelihood
that he or she would drive to work. Based on the elasticity results, a 1% increase in the
daily parking charge at work reduces the probability of driving to work by 0.11%, while
increasing the probability of choosing the alternative mode by 0.36%. Similarly, a 1% increase
in running costs reduce the probability of driving to work by 0.08%, while increasing the
probability of the alternative mode by 0.38%.
On the other hand, increasing on-street and off-street parking space availability at the res-
idence location produces significant odds ratios that are greater than 1. This suggests that
parking availability at home increases the likelihood of commuting to work by car, with a
stronger effect for on-street parking. A 1% increase in the number of on-street parking spaces
increases the probability of driving to work by 0.12%, while decreasing the probability of
the alternative mode by 0.49%. Likewise, a 1% increase in the number of off-street parking
supply at home increases the probability of driving to work by 0.06%, while decreasing the
probability of the alternative mode by 0.24%.
Interestingly, the odds ratio for off-street parking availability at the work location is also
greater than 1 though insignificant. Our finding may be due to the composition of our sample
since most of the commuters who drive to work (74%) park on-site at their employment site,
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which may result in their lack of concern about off-street parking availability at the work
location3.
Regarding the other variables, our odds ratios reveal that the farther away work is from home,
the more likely the commuter is to drive. Furthermore, the longer the distance traveled to
and from the nearest rail transit station, the more likely the commuter is to drive. Income
also has a significant odds ratio greater than 1, indicating that an increase in income increases
the likelihood of driving to work.
Another interesting result is the effect of rush hour on the likelihood of choosing a mode
choice. The odds ratio associated with our peak variable reveals that the likelihood of driving
to work tends to decrease during rush hours. This is not surprising since traffic congestion
costs occur primarily during peak periods. The probability of driving to work tends to
decrease by 7%, while the probability of not driving to work tends to increase by 35% as a
result of leaving to work during a rush hour.
Next, our conditional binary logit model is extended to multiple modes. Parking, land use
mix, income and distance variables are still used in their natural logarithmic form. All
estimations include a constant.
2.4.2 Conditional multinomial logit: which commute mode?
Results for our conditional multinomial logit specification are shown in Table 2.6. The
reference mode for this part of the analysis is driving. Our conditional multinomial and
3In contrast to on-street parking, for off-street parking, the available space, location and time are often
guaranteed without uncertainty. For example, street cleaning makes street parking temporarily unavailable.
Even though most cities in CA own a small amount of off-street parking supply, most city officials, especially
in large cities, consider provision of parking as a role of the private sector. Moreover, parking regulations
that mandate a minimum number of parking spaces for a given floor area for each possible use of the property
are also common, which ends up securing parking spaces at home and at work. In addition, employer paid
parking is also a common fringe benefit, which secures a free or partially subsidized parking space at the
work location, regardless of whether the spot is located on the premises of the work facility or rented by the
employer in a nearby commercial parking facility for employee use.
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Table 2.5: Conditional Binomial Logit Results
Dependent variable: Di Odds Ratio Elasticity Elasticity
(Di = 1) (Di = 1) (Di = 0)
Daily parking price 0.623*** -0.106 0.36
(0.095)
Off-street parking at work 1.143 0.027 -0.107
(0.142)
Residential off-street parking at home 1.357** 0.062 -0.243
(0.212)
On-street parking at home 1.850* 0.125 -0.491
(0.598)
Land Use Mix 1.201 0.037 -0.146
(0.156)
Rail station distance 1.019*** 0.159 -0.705
(0.007)
Population density at work 0.980** -0.054 0.187
(0.010)
Job density at work 0.996*** -0.069 0.15
(0.001)
Population density at home 0.965*** -0.116 0.348
(0.013)
Job density at home 0.988 -0.015 0.041
(0.009)
Income per person 1.187** 0.035 -0.137
(0.092)
Age 1.006 0.13 -0.51
(0.005)
Female 0.94 -1.246 5.066
(0.167)
White 0.782 -4.717 21.771
(0.125)
Distance 1.944*** 0.135 -0.53
(0.310)
Peak 0.690** -6.976 34.729
(0.110)
Running cost 0.784** -0.082 0.377
(0.081)
Speed 1.007 0.04 -0.058
(0.015)
Observations 927
Wald Chi2 112.41
Null hypothesis: odds ratio is 1
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the tract level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Estimations include a constant
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binary logit results are aligned. Raising a commuter’s daily parking price at work increases
the likelihood of the commuter travel to work by public transport or by a non-motorized
mode (walking or cycling). A 1% increase in daily parking prices reduces the probability
of driving to work by 0.09%, while it increases the probability of using public transit and
active commuting modes by 0.37% and 0.3%, respectively. As in the case of the conditional
binary logit model, the elasticity of driving with respect to daily parking price is low, which
is to be expected in a short-run model of travel demand. Another possible explanation may
be the existence of car parking fringe benefits in the form of free parking spaces at work.
Regarding parking availability at the work and residence sites, our odds ratios further re-
veal that increases in on-street parking availability at home, as well as off-street parking
availability both at work and home, significantly decrease the likelihood of commuting by
non-motorized modes. On the other hand, the likelihood of commuting by public transit
seems only to be significantly decreased by an increase in off-street parking at home. This is
an interesting correlation suggesting that parking features at the work location may impact
physical activity as they also affect the likelihood of choosing to use an active commuting
mode.
Regarding urban form, it is also interesting to note that an increase in the commuter’s
overall distance to the nearest rail transit station or of a decrease in land use mix at the
commuter’s employment site (which corresponds to an increase in the land use mix HHI)
only significantly decrease the likelihood of commuting by public transit over driving. Higher
population density at the residence census tract also increases the likelihood of taking public
transit over driving. Our correlations may be related to most commuters in our sample
living in urban and suburban areas of LA County with poor public transport service at
home. Another possible explanation for these results is the jobs-housing imbalance that
characterizes the County [Franco, 2013; SCAG, 2001]4.
4Jobs-housing balance refers to the distribution of employment relative to the distribution of resident
workers within a geographic area. The central concern of jobs-housing balance as it relates to transportation
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Table 2.6: Conditional Multinomial Logit Results
Dependent variable: Mi odds ratio Elasticity
(Mi = 2) (Mi = 3) (Mi = 1) (Mi = 2) (Mi = 3)
Daily parking price 1.584** 1.476* -0.088 0.372 0.302
(0.342) (0.316)
Off-street parking at work 1.059 0.683** 0.019 0.077 -0.362
(0.176) (0.105)
Residential off-street parking at home 0.728* 0.631* 0.067 -0.25 -0.393
(0.133) (0.152)
On-street parking at home 0.601 0.364* 0.126 -0.383 -0.886
(0.202) (0.211)
Land Use Mix 0.710* 0.979 0.04 -0.303 0.019
(0.125) (0.287)
Rail station distance 0.974** 0.985 0.162 -1.063 -0.522
(0.011) (0.011)
Population density at work 1.013 1.041*** -0.059 0.09 0.418
(0.015) (0.013)
Job density at work 1.004*** 1.002** -0.06 0.167 0.056
(0.001) (0.001)
Population density at home 1.053*** 1.021 -0.12 0.545 0.15
(0.016) (0.017)
Job density at home 1.020* 1.001 -0.011 0.078 -0.007
(0.010) (0.012)
Income per person 0.733*** 1.353** 0.015 -0.296 0.317
(0.070) (0.189)
Age 1 0.981** 0.124 0.165 -1.778
(0.007) (0.009)
Female 1.256 0.579* 1.393 27.38 -41.313
(0.316) (0.173)
White 1.143 2.147** -5.751 7.731 102.344
(0.229) (0.738)
Distance 1.705* 0.235*** 0.037 0.571 -1.408
(0.512) (0.060)
Peak 1.703** 2.000** -9.486 54.133 80.837
(0.361) (0.587)
Running cost 0.907 1.503*** -0.005 -0.19 0.761
(0.188) (0.231)
Speed 1.03 1.03 0.064 0.112 0.13
(0.040) (0.040)
Observations 899
Wald Chi2 369.65
Null hypothesis: odds ratio is 1
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the tract level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Estimations include a constant
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Thus, our conditional logit estimates suggest that strategies that promote densification,
increase land use mix, and improve transit accessibility in transit catchment areas may
positively influence work transit commuting. This in turn aligns with the idea that public
transport demand is to some extent conditioned by the built environment. The integration
of transport and land use planning is therefore also key to divert commuters from private
car to public transport and to attain sustainable development. Our results further suggest
that increasing daily parking prices or reducing off-street residence parking accessibility may
encourage work commuting by public transit.
2.5 Further Discussion
We now use our conditional binary logit model to make predictions for the Los Angeles
County commuters’ mode choice. This is accomplished by using the conditional binary logit
estimates to compute probabilities for a range of values for one particular variable (e.g. daily
parking charges) while using average values for the remaining variables. Table 2.7 describes
our base scenario when all the variables are set at their mean values. Tables 2.8 and 2.9
show the effects on the probability of driving to work under different scenarios and a range
of daily parking charges.
policy is the journey to work. The concept implicitly assumes that workers choose to work as close to home
as possible (or that workers choose homes as close to their jobs as possible). If a given region has a much
greater concentration of employment than resident workers, workers must be drawn from other areas, leading
to longer commutes. Similarly, if resident workers greatly outnumber job opportunities, they must seek jobs
in other more distant areas. LA County is a job-rich area within the Greater Los Angeles region and the
ratio workers-employed residents varies substantially across the county. For example, Franco (2013) shows
that the ratio in the year 2000 ranges from 0.27 (Lake Los Angeles) to 3.26 (Westwood). The ratio for
Downtown Los Angeles is 2.77.
52
2.5.1 Effects of Daily Parking Prices
Table 2.7 shows how the probability of driving falls as the daily parking price is gradually
increased (even if still parking on-site). The results indicate that if parking is free of charge,
while all other factors are equal to the corresponding mean values, then the probability of
driving is 95%. The drop of the probability to drive in response to changes in daily parking
prices is very gradual and not pronounced, holding all other variables constant at the mean.
One possible explanation for the observed low diversion from driving to non-driving is that
most drivers in the sample park on-site at work and, thus, are guaranteed a spot. Therefore,
even though free or inexpensive parking has a bearing on a commuter’s choice of driving
versus using public transport or active commuting, a guaranteed parking space at work or
abundant availability of workplace parking may be relevant in the choice of travel mode for
the journey to work. In theory, we expect workplace parking charges to be more effective
when guaranteed workplace parking capacity (on-site parking) is reduced. While a parking
charge secures an efficient allocation of scarce spaces, limited parking capacity restricts the
overall use of the car as a possible travel mode.
Unfortunately our model does not allow to test for the case where on-site parking at work
(that is, parking availability on-site) is reduced because we do not have data on on-site
parking for non-drivers. Table 2.7 also provides an overview of changes of the likelihood to
drive as parking availability at home changes, while evaluating parking prices at work at the
mean value. When the average daily parking price is combined with no parking availability
at home, the probability of driving to work drops to almost 57% if no on-street parking is
available, and to 75% if no off-street parking at home exists (that is, not having an own
dedicated parking space with certainty).
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Table 2.7: Probability of driving in response to varying significant parking variables
Home Parking
parking price Pr(Di = 1) Off-street Pr(Di = 1) On-street Pr(Di = 1)
0 0.95 0 0.75 0 0.57
1 0.93 1,000 0.79 1,000 0.67
2 0.91 2,000 0.82 2,000 0.76
3 0.9 3,000 0.84 3,000 0.8
4 0.89 4,000 0.85 4,000 0.83
5 0.88 5,000 0.86 5,000 0.85
6 0.87 6,000 0.87 6,000 0.86
7 0.87 7,000 0.87 7,000 0.87
8 0.86 8,000 0.88 8,000 0.88
9 0.85 9,000 0.88 9,000 0.89
10 0.85 10,000 0.88 10,000 0.89
11 0.84
12 0.84
13 0.83
14 0.83
15 0.82
For purposes of these computations, all other variables are evaluated at the mean
2.5.2 Effects of Daily Parking Charges and Home Parking Avail-
ability
Table 2.8, on the other hand, presents the effects of joint changes in daily parking prices
at work and parking availability at home. When daily parking charges at work are set to
zero under the scenario of home parking availability restrictions, the probability of driving
to work drops from 95% either to 90% in the case of no off-street parking (that is, no parking
certainty), or to 80% in the case of no on-street parking (that is, parking ease at home) at
home. The effect of no residential parking is even more pronounced when combined with
higher parking prices at the workplace.
Assessing the scenario of limited residential parking spaces (1000 spaces per square mile) re-
veals that coupling increases in daily parking prices at work with limited residential parking,
particularly on-street parking, can lead to the sought-after reduction in driving. For exam-
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Table 2.8: Probability of driving in response to joint variation of parking variables
Home Parking
Off-street On-street
parking price 0 1000 2000 0 1000 2000
0 0.9 0.92 0.93 0.8 0.86 0.91
1 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.75 0.82 0.87
2 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.71 0.79 0.85
3 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.68 0.76 0.83
4 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.66 0.74 0.82
5 0.8 0.83 0.86 0.64 0.73 0.8
6 0.78 0.82 0.85 0.62 0.71 0.79
7 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.6 0.7 0.78
8 0.76 0.8 0.83 0.59 0.69 0.77
9 0.76 0.79 0.82 0.58 0.68 0.76
10 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.57 0.67 0.75
11 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.56 0.66 0.75
12 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.55 0.65 0.74
13 0.73 0.76 0.8 0.54 0.64 0.73
14 0.72 0.76 0.8 0.53 0.63 0.73
15 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.52 0.63 0.72
ple, setting on-street parking at home to only 1000 spaces per square mile while charging
only $10 a day for parking at work can lead to a reduction of the probability of driving to
work to 67%. A more pronounced effect of the same on-street parking availability at home
combined with a daily parking price of $15 at the workplace can be seen in Table 2.8, where
the probability of driving drops even further to 63%.
Therefore, limited access to parking at home affects vehicle usage, even when employee
parking subsidies (e.g. free parking and/or secured parking at work) are in place. The
magnitude of the shift in mode choice from driving to non-driving commuting can, therefore,
be large when travel demand programs rely both on residential parking supply restrictions
and workplace parking charges. Our results’ implications are thus also aligned with recent
studies that have shown that limited access to home parking is an effective way of reducing
vehicle use on work trips [Weinberger, 2012; Christiansen et al., 2017].
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2.5.3 Effects of Daily Parking Charges and Urban Form
Land use attributes in terms of density and mixture of different uses are surrogate measures
of the built environment. These measures capture additional influences of some concealed
factors affecting people’s travel mode choices, to a certain degree. For example, increased
density results in reduced spatial separation, enhancing travel by all modes. However, non-
motorized modes benefit more from reduced spatial separation than motorized modes because
the former are more sensitive to distance changes than the latter.
Table 2.9: Probability of driving in response to joint variation of parking price and urban
form measures
Parking Land Use Job Population Distance to
price Mix Density Density Rail Station
0.1 0.2 80,000 120,000 15,000 22,000 0.5 1
0 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.9 0.91
1 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.86 0.88
2 0.9 0.91 0.9 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.86
3 0.89 0.9 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.82 0.85
4 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.8 0.83
5 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.79 0.82
6 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.81
7 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.84 0.77 0.8
8 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.76 0.79
9 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.75 0.78
10 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.74 0.77
11 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.73 0.76
12 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.8 0.83 0.81 0.72 0.76
13 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.8 0.82 0.8 0.72 0.75
14 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.8 0.82 0.8 0.71 0.75
15 0.8 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.7 0.74
Table 2.9 presents the effects of daily parking prices at work on the probability of driving to
work under different land use mix, density (employment and population) and overall acces-
sibility to public transit scenarios at the workplace destination census tract. We remind the
reader that our land use mix measure is an HHI index summing the squares of the propor-
tion of different land use component parts. Our land use components include residential use,
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open space and different types of non-residential uses (e.g. industrial, office, commercial,
parking, etc). Therefore, the higher values of HHI correspond to less land use mix. Our HHI
average value is 0.24. Above-average values of HHI result in probabilities of driving to work
higher than those computed at the mean. So we focus on the cases where the HHI is below
average. Similarly, only above average values of the density measures are explored.
Overall, improvements in land use mix, increased job density, and increased population
density at the work location all lead to similar effects on the probability of driving, when
combined with changes in parking prices. Transit accessibility seems to be more effective
in reducing the likelihood to drive to work, which can bring down the chances of driving to
work to 72% in the case of a total distance of 0.5 miles to the rail transit station (again, this
is the sum of distance from home to the rail transit station and from work to the rail transit
station) when combined with a parking price of $12 (the average constructed parking price
for the sample).
Our results thus suggest that there are features of the land use that are important to a
commuter’s short-term mode choices that are not fully captured by just travel times or
costs. This finding is consistent with past evidence on how urban form affects travel mode
choices (see for example Cervero and Gorham (1995), Cervero and Kockelman (1997), and
Cervero (2002)). In fact, urban form has diverse impacts on travel distance and mode.
Compact development patterns, featured by relatively high population density, mixed land
use, and easily accessible public transit facilities, are beneficial for walking, cycling and
public transportation. The disincentive effect of daily parking charges at the workplace on
driving can thus be reinforced if combined with land use and zoning policies that create
more balanced land use, better overall public transport accessibility and more compacted
built environments.
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2.5.4 Effects of Daily Parking Charges and Household Income
We also examine the effects of daily parking prices under alternative annual household in-
come scenarios on the probability of driving to work in Table 2.10. Consider a parking cost
set at the daily average parking charge for the prediction sample ($12). Our predicted prob-
abilities show that commuters in higher-income households have a more inelastic demand for
driving when there is a parking charge. In particular, the probability ranges from an 80%
chance of driving to work with an annual household income per person of $5,000 to an 86%
chance with an annual household income per person of $80,000. The fact that the magni-
tude of the drop in probability of driving resulting from the drop in income does not match
expectations for such a huge drop in income may be explained by the combined existence of
secure parking at work and the dispersed land use pattern and overall low accessibility to
public transit that characterizes LA County.
Table 2.10: Probability of driving in response to joint variation of parking price and income
Parking price Income per person
5,000 80,000
0 0.93 0.95
1 0.9 0.94
2 0.89 0.93
3 0.87 0.92
4 0.86 0.91
5 0.85 0.9
6 0.84 0.89
7 0.83 0.89
8 0.82 0.88
9 0.81 0.88
10 0.81 0.87
11 0.8 0.87
12 0.8 0.86
13 0.79 0.86
14 0.78 0.85
15 0.78 0.85
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Thus, our overall results show that the disincentives of parking charges at work may be
hindered by the existence of secured parking at the workplace and by the lack of viable
travel mode alternatives to driving when choosing the travel mode for the journey to work.
As a result, the probability of commuting to work by car is still high when workplace parking
prices increase, regardless of the household income bracket.
2.6 Conclusion
The worst traffic congestion in urban areas, and in particular in core-oriented cities, occurs
during the periods of travel to and from work. Congestion exists partly because a lot of
car owners find it more convenient to travel to work by car than by public transit or by
active commuting, even in congested situations. Pricing the use of road space, parking
policy and subsidizing public transit are just a few policy measures that have been proposed
to reduce urban traffic congestion by increasing either the disincentives of car usage or the
attractiveness of public transit.
This paper examines how parking prices and parking availability affect the probability of
choosing to drive to work, using LA County as the context of our analysis. Moreover, and for
completeness, we also explore the role urban form may play in the choice of travel mode for
the journey to work. Our results show that daily parking prices have a significant negative
impact on the decision to drive alone to work, where a 10% increase in daily parking prices
reduces the probability of driving alone by 1.1%. Our conditional multinomial logit results
further indicate that higher daily parking prices shift people away from driving to public
transit. Another interesting finding is that work-related commuting appears to be in part a
product of convenience and accessibility constraints: when public transit is proximal, workers
are more likely to travel via that mode, whereas having parking available at the worksite
is positively associated with work-related vehicle usage. In particular, parking at home,
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whether on-street or off-street, also has a significant impact on the decision to drive. The
policy-relevant implication of these results is that maximum parking standards, and removal
of parking and of eligible parking expense payment fringe benefits may reduce vehicle use
on trips to work.
Furthermore, good accessibility to public transit at origin (residence) and destination (work)
locations is also found to reduce vehicle usage. While limited number of parking spaces
restricts the overall possibility of car use, parking prices help secure efficient allocation of
scarce parking resources. Since the majority of workers in Los Angeles County are guaranteed
a parking space by their employer, any move towards fewer and paid-for parking spaces can
have a significant impact on commute mode choice. This, in turn, can also reduce congestion
and urban pollution and the need for large investments in road capacity.
Like almost every empirical study of parking and vehicle use, endogeneity and selection bias
are also limitations of our analysis. Residents are aware of parking availability when they
decide to rent or buy a dwelling and when deciding where to work. It is then reasonable
to assume that individuals with lower car use or car ownership are more likely to choose to
live with reduced home parking availability and therefore also choose to work in locations
where parking availability is smaller. In addition, individuals with unobserved preferences
for using public transport, walking or cycling may choose to live in central areas at higher
rates than in the suburbs. Thus, the potential for endogeneity and selection bias suggest
caution should be taken in interpreting our results.
Finally, our study is based on Los Angeles County, which is widely recognized for its automo-
bile dependence and associated issues with traffic congestion due to the decentralized nature
of the county’s density along freeway corridors. Thus, our results may not necessarily be
representative of the rest of the country. Studies from other US counties could help solidify
the results of our research.
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Chapter 3
Determinants of Public Transit Use
and the Role of Social Influence
3.1 Introduction
The majority of trips in the United States are made using a vehicle, and although the benefits
of reducing vehicle usage are salient, the trend does not seem to be reversing. Public trans-
portation is an important alternative to vehicle usage, and is generally thought of as a more
sustainable mode of transportation, conserving energy and reducing emissions. However,
ridership in many American cities falls short of what the system was built for. Although
transit ridership has been increasing nationally over the years for a while, the increases over
the past decade were largely due to increases in ridership in the New York region, while
ridership of most of the other top transit areas declined (Mallett, 2018). National ridership,
as well as New York’s, has been also declining since 2014. Some of the proposed reasons
for the drop in ridership include rising vehicle ownership, gentrification, the rise of services
such as Uber and Lyft, to mention a few. However, careful examination of these factors is
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required before we can claim causality. Furthermore, apart from New York, transit ridership
has been low even when it was on the rise.
There is a vast literature examining the factors affecting a commuter’s preferences for one
mode over the other, covering an array of built-environment measures, trip characteristics
including financial costs, transit service accessibility and quality, and demographics. One
thing is evident: public transit is not a perfect substitute for vehicle use. Even though
transit is more affordable, and in some instances could be relatively convenient, commuters’
preferences are still in favor of driving. To address transit use and understand the relative
importance of underlying factors promoting it, it is important to examine these factors
simultaneously, and across a number of regions to learn whether there are elements that are
region-specific. It is also necessary to go beyond the baseline fundamental determinants that
are well-studied in the literature and consider alternative factors, such as the role of social
influence, that can indirectly, but significantly, impact transit use and how commuters and
policymakers alike view it.
The goal of this paper is threefold. First, the paper builds a binary discrete choice model that
estimates public transit use, which includes both bus and rail transit, incorporating a rich
set of commute mode choice determinants. What this paper does differently is that it jointly
examines these potential determinants at the tract level, in the workplace and residence
neighborhoods simultaneously, across a number of major US cities. In order to do so, a
unique dataset is built by drawing on data from various sources, and constructing variables
using Geographic Information System (GIS) tools. The dataset combines household travel
surveys from California, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. The travel surveys
provide tract level locations of both the residences and workplaces, which are then exploited
in the construction of transit-access route distances using GIS tools, the construction of
transit and driving trip durations and distances using Google Maps API, the construction of
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parking prices and gas expenses at the zipcode level through webscraping, and in matching
other tract-level data.
Second, the paper introduces social influence to the model. Social influence arises when
an individual’s utility is a function of the actions and behaviors of the social group the
individual is affiliated with. The role of social influence in commute mode choice in general,
and in public transit use in particular, remains understudied, even though the importance of
social interactions in decision making is increasingly recognized by economists. Of particular
relevance are Manski (1993), Brock and Durlauf (2001), and Walker et al. (2011), and their
discussions of social effects and estimation issues, as well as McFadden’s (2010) discussion
of how social interactions affect perceptions and preferences. Although the social reference
group can be defined along many lines, ranging from immediate networks, such as family,
friends, and coworkers, to broader definitions of social groups that an individual identifies
with, this paper is specifically interested in the effect of the broader social group, and defines
it as the social group encompassed within the tract neighborhood, whether residence or
workplace. This social group is referred to as the spatial social group, and is measured by
the local field effect, which is the share of transit users in a census tract. The definition
of a social group is refined further by introducing both an income and a racial dimension
to produce what are referred to hereafter as the income-group and the racial group. The
income-group social influence is measured by the median transit user income, whereas the
racial group social influence is measured by the percentage of white transit users.
Third, the paper makes a methodological contribution while accounting for potential en-
dogeneity of social influence. A novel instrumental variable (IV) is constructed to identify
the spatial social influence. The IV is the weighted average distance of commute trips of
individuals in the relevant tract, and is computed for both the residence tract, and the work-
place tract. The weighted average distance of trips for a given tract satisfies the exclusion
criterion of IVs because the average distance of trips of a single commuter’s neighbors or
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coworkers would only affect his decision to use transit through its effect on their decision to
use transit. The effect of the neighbors’ and coworkers’ decision to use transit are the social
influence effects of the residence and workplace respectively. The only potential correla-
tion with the error term may arise because of potential collinearity between the commuter’s
actual commute distance and the weighted average distance of commute trips for the rele-
vant tract. This possibility is overcome, however, by the inclusion of the individual’s actual
commute distance in the model. Furthermore, the weighted average commute distance is a
relevant instrument because commute distance is found to be associated with public transit
use, and the evidence that emerges in the paper rules out the possibility of it being a weak
instrument. On the other hand, to identify income-group and racial social influence, an al-
ternative identification strategy is employed. Both income and racial group fixed effects are
controlled for, as well as the percentage of transit users in a tract, which is argued to control
for tract-specific heterogeneity that would impact transit use. An interaction of the income
and racial group fixed effects with the percentage of transit users in a tract further controls
for tract-specific heterogeneity that would impact transit use and is income- or race-specific.
The evidence that emerges from the analysis confirms that white commuters and richer com-
muters are less likely to use transit. A $10,000 increase in household income reduces transit
use probability by 0.2 percentage points, whereas being white reduces it by 2.8 percentage
points. Both population densities and job densities positively increase the likelihood of tran-
sit use, whereas a longer access route decreases it. The rail access route seems to have a
larger impact in the workplace tract. The farther the workplace is from the residence the
more likely the commuter is to use transit, and for every additional 10 minutes spent on
the trip when using transit (relative to the time spent driving) the probability of transit
use drops by 2.2 percentage points. Higher parking prices encourage transit use, and so do
higher gas expenses.
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The findings suggest that spatial social influence exist in both the residence and workplace
tracts, implying that a 1 percentage point increase in transit use among neighbors is asso-
ciated with a 0.15 percentage point increase in the probability of a commuter’s transit use,
whereas the same increase among coworkers leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the
probability of the commuter’s transit use. The result for the workplace persists even when
using the IV, but the effect of the residence network is no longer significant. Exogeneity
tests, however, indicate that, given the wide array of control variables, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of exogeneity of spatial social influence. Taken together with the large first-
stage F-statistics rejecting the weakness of the IVs, and the fact that the estimates of the
marginal effects do not change when using the IV, the failure to reject the null hypothesis
of exogeneity implies that the model adequately controls for major sources of heterogeneity
and that endogeneity of spatial social influence is not a concern. Findings also indicate that
income-group social influence is also significant, implying that the rich are more likely to use
transit as the median income of transit users rises. The effect exists for both the residence
and workplace, but is of a larger magnitude for the workplace tract, implying once more
that the effect of coworkers is more important than that of neighbors. Overall, racial social
influence has no or very little impact on the decision to use transit.
This analysis reveals that ridership may benefit by encouraging unconventional groups to
use transit. For example, if the rich increase their use of transit, the effect will go beyond
that one-time increase, encouraging more commuters to use transit through social influence.
Policymakers tend to focus on the poor, but evidence may suggest that it would be more
effective to target the rich, whose choice will cascade into increased use by both rich and
poor. Modeling social influence at both the residence and workplace allows us to gauge
the relative effect of neighbors and coworkers, and hence determine the more effective social
group to target for a greater impact.
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This study contributes to the literature in many respects. First, it builds a unique dataset
that spans many US cities, and simultaneously models the determinants in both the work-
place and residence at the census tract level. Second, the dataset includes a rich set of
variables, constructed by synthesizing data from various sources, and exploiting the avail-
ability of both workplace and residence census tract information to compute specific commute
trip characteristics. The model presented is one that jointly estimates a wide range of deter-
minants, rather than limit the focus to built-environment factors or to trip characteristics.
Third, social influence is examined and both neighbors and coworkers are accounted for.
Furthermore, alternative definitions of social groups are explored; namely, spatial groups,
income groups, and racial groups. Fourth, a novel IV is constructed to address potential
endogeneity in the case of spatial social influence, and an alternative identification strategy
is devised in the cases of income-group and racial social influence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a brief overview of the literature and
discusses further the motivation for the paper. Section 3.3 describes the data used, the
construction of the dataset, and the variable definitions. Section 3.4 presents the model to
be estimated and lays out the identification strategy for social influence and the construction
of the IV used, while section 3.5 reports and interprets the results. Section 3.6 discusses the
implications of the findings, whereas section 3.7 concludes, describing the study limitations
and suggesting potential extensions for future research.
3.2 Background
The determinants explored in this paper can be grouped into socioeconomic characteristics,
neighborhood characteristics, transit accessibility, and trip characteristics. Socioeconomic
characteristics are included to gauge for factors such as income and race, among other
characteristics. Neighborhood characteristics include built environment measures as well
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as neighborhood demographics. Several studies confirm the role of built environment mea-
sures in travel mode choice, such as Cervero (1996), Cervero and Kockelman (1997), and
Ewing and Cervero (2001), whereas a few fail to find a significant impact, such as Crane and
Crepeau (1998). Standard built environment measures, such as population density and job
density are used in this paper, as well as land use measures and pedestrian-oriented inter-
section density for robustness checks. Transit accessibility is gauged by rail transit station
access-route distance. Trip characteristics refer to financial costs, time costs, and distance
costs. Financial costs include both gas expenses and parking prices, and both are expected
to predict an increase in transit use probability. The expectation for gas expenses arises
from the fact that higher gas prices reduce vehicle use [Bento et al.,2009; Gillingham, 2014]
and so may increase transit use, and that for parking prices from evidence on a significant
impact of parking pricing on driving [Feeney, 1989; Shoup, 2005; Khordagui, 2017; Franco
and Khordagui, 2018]. The difference between the trip duration using transit and that us-
ing a vehicle is also accounted for, while accounting for the distance of the commute trip
separately.
Several reasons motivate the interest in the role of social influence in transit use. First, there
is a wealth of literature on the importance of social effects in characterizing people’s behavior.
Applications in the economics literature include labor market outcomes and hiring [Bayer
et al., 2008; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Brown and Laschever, 2012; Cornelissen et al., 2017],
education [Sacerdote, 2001; Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2003; Angrist and Lang, 2004;
Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009], health [Powell et al., 2005; Nakajima, 2007; Trogdon
et al., 2008; Fortin and Yazbeck, 2015], crime [Glaeser et al., 1996; Patacchini and Zenou,
2009], finance [Bursztyn et al., 2014; Foucault and Fresard, 2014; Kaustia and Rantala,
2015], and consumption [Grinblatt et al., 2008; Moretti, 2011], to mention a few. In the
commute mode choice literature, Walker et al. (2011) find evidence using a discrete choice
framework and a dataset from the Netherlands, that the socially-defined reference group
significantly affects the transportation mode choice of an individual. Similarly, Kim et al.
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(2017) find evidence that inter- and intra-household interactions have a strong impact on
transportation mode choice in Cincinnati, while Goetzke (2008) finds that network effects
play a role in transportation mode choice in New York. Pike and Lubell (2018) collect
data from University of California Davis students and also find that social networks impact
transportation mode choice.
Second, understanding the role of social influence in people’s decisions is important because
such a role may lead to social multipliers (Glaeser et al., 2003), potentially generating multi-
ple equilibria (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000). Such an analysis sheds light on the indirect
effects of shifting demographics that go beyond the explicit effects. Possible explanations
for the existence of such an effect may be contagion, conformity, or social learning (Young,
2009). According to contagion models, commuters may be more likely to use public transit
because they met public transit users, whereas according to conformity models a commuter’s
decision to use transit is a function of the number or proportion of the reference social group
using transit. Social learning models, the more prevalent models in the economics literature,
would imply that commuters learn about the transit service by observing transit use of the
social group, which emphasizes the informational role of social interactions.
Third, social influence is of particular relevance to transit use because many view public
transportation as welfare that exists to serve the poor. Indeed, poor commuters are more
likely to use transit, and previous research shows that the poor choose to locate where transit
is accessible [LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983; Glaeser et al., 2008]. Therefore, there is reason to
believe that some commuters may avoid transit use because of dominance by the poor or
by a racial or ethnic minority group. Focusing on a related phenomenon, Schelling (1971)
illustrates how residential patterns change as a result of individual choices responding to
the location redistribution of the reference group, and he introduces the notion of tipping
points for segregation of neighborhoods. Card et al. (2008) use census tract data between
1970 and 2000 to confirm that there is “strong evidence that white population flows exhibit
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tipping-like behavior in most cities.” Moreover, some studies find evidence that migration
leads to native-flight from neighborhoods receiving migrants [Accetturo et al., 2014; Mussa
et al., 2017]. Therefore, if such impacts are observed for residential choices, then they may
potentially be observed for commute mode choice as well.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data Sources
The dataset is built by matching data from different sources and constructing variables
using GIS techniques. Household travel surveys represent the foundation of the dataset.
The household travel surveys used are the California Household Travel Survey (CHTS) for
2012, the Massachusetts Travel Survey (MTS)1 for 2011, and the New York and New Jersey
Regional Household Travel Survey (RHTS) for 2011. The CHTS sample will be referred
to hereafter as the CA sample, the MTS as the MA sample, and the RHTS as the NY-NJ
sample. The travel surveys are cross-sectional datasets based on travel diaries. Table B.1
in the appendix lists all the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) included in the sample.
Although the RHTS includes observations from a number of MSAs, the data used for the
purposes of this analysis are restricted to only one MSA. The same can be said of the MTS
data. Therefore, the NY-NJ and MA samples are each made up of only one MSA (and the
observations of the remaining MSAs of the RHTS and the MTS data are added back later on
for robustness checks). On the other hand, the CA sample is made up of 5 different MSAs.
Household characteristics, commute mode choice, and work and home locations are obtained
from the travel surveys. The CHTS and RHTS have work and home locations at the census
tract level, and so whenever the work or home locations are used in any GIS analysis for the
1Not available online. Acquired by contacting the Massachusetts Department of Transportation.
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CA and NY-NJ samples, the geocoded address of the census tract centroid is used. On the
other hand, the MTS has work and home locations at the block level, and so the geocoded
address of the block centroid is used whenever the work or home locations are used for GIS
analysis for the MA sample.
Other sources of data are the American Community Survey (ACS), where some of the demo-
graphic variables are obtained, and the Census Transportation Planning Products (CTPP),
where the commuting mode breakdowns for both the workplace and residence tracts are
obtained. The number of jobs, as well as origin-destination data, are obtained from the
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD). GIS shapefiles of the rail stations for
the relevant years are obtained from the National Transportation Atlas Database (NTAD)
published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and supplemented by shapefiles from
the Berkeley Library Geodata for the NY-NJ sample. The street maps are obtained from the
Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) shapefiles. Time
duration for commute trips for different modes are obtained from Google Maps API, and
parking prices and gas prices from ParkMe.com and GasBuddy.com respectively. Table B.2
in the appendix lists all variables, and their sources.
3.3.2 Variables
The model explores the impact of a rich set of variables on public transit use. The dependent
variable is whether an individual uses transit or not, whether rail or bus. The binary variable
takes on a value of 1 if the commuter uses transit and 0 if he drives. Therefore, the sample
is limited to transit users and drivers, and so any further reference to commuters refers
to transit users and drivers. Along with the socioeconomic characteristics obtained from
travel surveys, such as household income and size, and commuter age, sex and race, there
are neighborhood characteristics, transit access measures, trip characteristics including time
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and financial costs, and social influence measures. Neighborhood characteristics accounted
for are population density, job density, white percentage of commuters, and the median
household income of commuters. All neighborhood characteristics are for both the workplace
and residence tracts. For the workplace tract, the measures for the White percentage of
commuters and the median household income of commuters are those of workers in the tract
of interest, not residents.
Transit access is measured by transit access distance. Transit access distance measures are
constructed using GIS tools and distinguish between rail stations and bus stops. A street
network is constructed using the TIGER street shapefiles. The exact access routes between
either the residence or workplace location (geocoded centroids of census tracts) and the
geocoded locations of the nearest rail station and bus stop are constructed. Figure 3.1 shows
an illustration of the construction of the access routes. The commute trip characteristics
include a variety of measures. One measure is the distance of the trip, which is measured
by the Euclidean distance between the residence and workplace. The objective of using this
measure is to learn how the proximity of the workplace to the residence impacts transit
use rather than learn how the distance traveled using a particular commute mode impacts
transit use. Using driving distance, from Google Maps API, for example, although highly
correlated, would incorporate a driving-specific cost. Furthermore, the trip distance reported
in some travel surveys is not used because that measure is a function of the commute mode,
which would render the estimate highly endogenous.
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Figure 3.1: Transit Access Route Illustration
Another trip characteristic examined is the additional time cost incurred when using public
transit. This is measured by computing the difference between the trip duration using
transit and that when driving. This measure is mostly positive but not necessarily always
so, because in some cases it may take less time to arrive to work using transit than driving.
Trip duration are obtained from Google Maps API, which offers only current (or future)
measures. Therefore, an important assumption made while using this measure is that the
relative trip durations of 2018 closely mimic those of 2011 and 2012.
Financial costs associated with a trip are also measured. However, only costs associated with
driving are measured for lack of accurate and prevalent data on transit fares from residence
to workplace. The costs considered are parking prices and gas expenses. Parking prices are
obtained for the workplace location at the zipcode level. An average of the daily price is
computed for every zipcode using posted daily prices when available, while computing them
from hourly prices otherwise. For areas with no parking prices, the daily parking price is set
to $0. Gas prices are obtained for both the workplace and residential zipcode. The average
gas price for all zipcodes is computed, and then the workplace and residential zipcode prices
are compared to determine the lowest price for each commuter. The lowest gas price is then
used to compute gas expenses, using driving distance obtained from Google Maps API. An
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average of 22 miles per gallon is assumed for the computation of the gas expense. Once more,
parking price, gas prices, and Google Maps API are current data (2018), and the assumption
is that the magnitudes and distributions of the measures in 2018 closely reflect those of 2011
and 2012.
Measures for social influence are divided into three different groups: spatial, income-group,
and racial. These measures are all constructed for both the workplace and residence tracts,
and are based on CTPP data. The CTPP data are special tabulations of the ACS that
facilitate transportation analyses. One interesting feature is that certain breakdowns of
transportation modes are given at the workplace as well as at the residence. The data at
the workplace give the transportation mode of people who work in the specific census tract,
whereas those at the residence give the transportation mode choice of people living in the
tract of interest. This is advantageous because the analysis is not only exploring the impact
in the residential tract, but the impact in the workplace as well. Therefore, these data are
matched to the travel survey data such that the workplace tabulations are matched to the
workplace tracts, and residence tabulations to the residence tracts. Subsequently, the CTPP
residence measures are used for the purpose of calculating the social influence variables at
the residence census tract, whereas the CTPP workplace measures are used for the workplace
calculations.
The spatial social influence is measured as the percentage of commuters in a given tract
who are public transit users. Spatial influence is going to be referred to in the model as
SNRi and SN
W
i where the R and W superscripts correspond to the residence and workplace
tracts respectively. Income group influence is referred to in the model as YNRi and YN
W
i .
The median household income of public transit users is used as a measure for income-group
influence, and is referred to as Median Transit Income. This is used to determine whether
the income composition of the transit users affects the decision of a particular individual to
take public transportation. Median Transit Income is expected to have a positive impact on
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Table 3.1: Social Influence Variables
Variable Name Variable Measure
Spatial Social Influence
Transit Use RateR (SNRi )
Transit Users in Residence Tract
Commuters in Residence Tract × 100%
Transit Use RateW (SNWi )
Transit Users in Workplace Tract
Commuters in Workplace Tract × 100%
Income-Group Social Influence
Median Transit IncomeR (YNRi ) Median Income of Transit Users in Residence Tract
Median Transit IncomeW (YNWi ) Median Income of Transit Users in Workplace Tract
Racial Social Influence
Transit White RateR (RNRi )
White Transit Users in Residence Tract
All T ransit Users in Residence Tract × 100%
Transit White RateW (RNWi )
White Transit Users in Workplace Tract
All T ransit Users in Workplace Tract × 100%
high income commuters. Interaction terms are utilized to distinguish the different effects.
Interaction terms interact the Median Transit Income with a binary variable, RICHRi or
RICHWi , that takes on the value 1 if the commuter has a household income above the
median of his tract. The racial social influence is referred to in the model as RNRi and RN
W
i .
The racial measures are in terms of whites and minorities (nonwhites). The percentage of
white transit users, which is referred to as the Transit White Rate, is used as a measure
for the racial influence effect. This measure is interacted with a binary variable, WHITEi,
indicating whether the commuter is white, in order to identify the different effects. Table
3.1 summarizes all the social influence variables discussed.
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 presents the overall descriptive statistics of the dataset, while Table 3.4
presents those of the social influence measures. The full sample has over 20,000 commuters,
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and is made up of only those who either drive or use transit. Out of all these commuters,
around 22% use transit, while the rest drive. The percentage of transit users varies from one
sample to another, with the lowest percentage in the CA sample at 10.5% and the highest
in NY-NJ at 38%. The average household income is $116,000, and although 68% of the
commuters in the full sample are White, the percentage ranges from 55% in CA to 87% in
MA.
The average route distance to the nearest rail transit station is 2.8 miles for the residence
tract and 3.3 miles for the workplace tract, with the shortest being in NY-NJ at 1.9 miles for
the residence tract and 1.4 for the workplace. The average Euclidean distance from residence
to workplace is 7.9 miles, while on average, commuters would spend 46 additional minutes
commuting if they use transit. Note that this time includes transit access and egress times,
while the driving time does not include any time needed to get from a parking location to
work. The average daily parking price in the full sample is $8.5, and ranges from as low as
$3.3 in CA to $14.6 in NY-NJ. Note that these averages are of parking prices the commuters
in the sample would face, and do not necessarily reflect the average price of parking over all
the MSAs. Gas prices in the full sample are $3.2 on average, ranging from $2.9 in MA and
NY-NJ up to $3.6 in CA. The gas expense is estimated to be $1.6 on average.
Table 3.4 shows that transit use rate in the workplace tract (20%) is higher than that in
the residence tract (16.7%). Moreover, the Median Transit Income is consistently higher
in the residence tract than in the workplace tract. Although the Median Transit Income
($104,309) is lower than the overall Median Commuter Income ($107,425) in the residence
tract, the difference is much larger between the Median Transit Income ($73,430) and the
Median Commuter Income ($94,381) in the workplace tract. The Transit White Rate is also
higher in the residence tract (50.7%) than in the workplace tract (33.5%), and the deviation
from the Commuter White Rate seems to be more pronounced for the workplace tract where
there is almost a 20 percentage point difference compared to a 7.4 percentage point difference
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Sample & Socioeconomic and Neighborhood Characteris-
tics
Variable Full CA NY-NJ MA
Sample Size 20,068 8,075 6,452 5,541
Transit Use (%) 21.9 10.5 38 19.5
(41.4) (30.9) (48.6) (39.7)
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Household Income ($) 116,004 115,474 107,377 126,821
(72,837) (74,448) (65,219) (77,340)
Household Size 2.9 3 2.7 3
(1.3) (1.4) (1.3) (1.3)
Age 46.4 45.8 46.7 47
(13.8) (14.7) (12.1) (14.4)
White (%) 68.1 54.7 69 86.6
(46.6) (49.8) (46.2) (34.1)
Female (%) 49.3 46.2 50.1 53
(50.0) (50.0) (50.0) (50.0)
Above Median IncomeR 48.2 49.7 44.2 50.7
(50.0) (50.0) (50.0) (50.0)
Above Median IncomeW 54.6 58.5 50.2 54.1
(49.8) (49.3) (50.0) (50.0)
Neighborhood Characteristics
Population DensityR (per m2) 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.003
(0.009) (0.003) (0.014) (0.004)
Population DensityW (per m2) 0.006 0.003 0.010 0.004
(0.008) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004)
Job DensityR (per m2) 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.015) (0.004) (0.024) (0.013)
Job DensityW (per m2) 0.031 0.010 0.053 0.038
(0.081) (0.026) (0.106) (0.092)
Commuter White RateR (%) 58.1 44.3 58.8 77.2
(28.9) (25.4) (29.2) (21.3)
Commuter White RateW (%) 53.6 39.8 51.7 75.9
(21.3) (17.2) (16.9) (10.3)
Median Commuter IncomeR ($) 107,425 104,822 107,649 110,956
(36,944) (39,335) (35,364) (34,788)
Median Commuter IncomeW ($) 94,381 87,683 97,058 101,024
(19,305) (22,361) (17,005) (12,906)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics: Transit Access & Trip Characteristics
Variable Full CA NY-NJ MA
Transit Access
Distance to RailR (mi) 3.3 5.6 1.9 1.7
(4.9) (6.7) (2.4) (1.8)
Distance to RailW (mi) 2.8 4.8 1.4 1.4
(4.6) (6.2) (2.2) (1.8)
Trip Characteristics
Distance (mi) 7.9 8.7 8.5 6.3
(7.4) (7.5) (8.1) (6.0)
Time Difference (min) 46.4 53.7 42.5 40.3
(33.5) (32.1) (34.2) (32.6)
Parking Prices ($/day) 8.5 3.3 14.6 9.1
(15.9) (9.8) (20.4) (14.2)
Gas Price ($/gallon) 3.2 3.6 2.9 2.9
(0.4) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Gas Expense ($) 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.2
(1.4) (1.6) (1.4) (1.1)
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.4: Social Influence Descriptive Statistics
Variable Full CA NY-NJ MA
Spatial Social Influence
Transit Use RateR (%) 16.7 8.4 28.9 14.8
(22.7) (11.3) (30.9) (17.1)
Transit Use RateW (%) 20.0 9.1 35.9 17.3
(26.3) (13.1) (34.8) (19.1)
Income-Group Social Influence
Median Transit IncomeR ($) 104,309 93,332 110,705 111,306
(54,672) (56,086) (55,372) (49,010)
Median Transit IncomeW ($) 73,430 70,789 73,864 77,514
(32,751) (36,406) (27,934) (31,521)
Racial Social Influence
Transit White RateR (%) 50.7 36.5 49.8 72.2
(35.5) (34.5) (33.4) (28.2)
Transit White RateW (%) 33.5 21.4 29.1 54.0
(29.4) (29.6) (22.2) (26.4)
Standard errors in parentheses
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in the residence tract. The overall Commuter White Rate and Income in both the residence
and workplace tracts are controlled for in the model to account for these differences.
3.4 Empirical Model
3.4.1 Fundamental Model
Public transit use is modeled as a function of social influence SRi and S
W
i (where the su-
perscripts indicate residence and workplace respectively), socioeconomic characteristics Xi,
neighborhood characteristics BRi and B
W
i , transit accessibility A
R
i and A
W
i , trip characteris-
tics Ci, and MSA fixed effects νi. Parking prices and gas expenses are modeled in logarithmic
form. Let T ∗i be the commuter’s unobserved propensity to use public transit, and Ti be a
binary variable taking the value 1 if the commuter uses transit, and 0 otherwise (drives). The
latent variable T ∗i and its relationship with the discrete binary variable Ti can be represented
as follows:
T ∗i = f(S
R
i ,S
W
i ,Xi,B
R
i ,B
W
i , A
R
i , A
W
i ,Ci, νi) (3.1)
Ti =
 1 if T
∗
i > 0
0 if T ∗i ≤ 0
(3.2)
A binary probit model is used to estimate the relationship. In other words, the model to be
estimated is specified as:
Pr[Ti = 1 | SRi ,SWi ,Xi,BRi ,BWi , ARi , AWi ,Ci, νi] = Φ(SRi ,SWi ,Xi,BRi ,BWi , ARi , AWi ,Ci, νi)
(3.3)
78
The first binary model to be estimated will be one that examines the roles of all the factors
of interest except social influence. The purpose of this estimation is to offer an overview of
the impact of the fundamental factors believed to directly affect transit use. Therefore, the
first model to be estimated models the latent variable T ∗i as follows:
T ∗i = XiβX +B
R
i βBR +B
W
i βBW + βARA
R
i + βAWA
W
i +CiβC + νi + εi (3.4)
3.4.2 Spatial Social Influence
Model
The second model to be estimated builds on equation 3.4, and adds the spatial social influence
variables SNRi and SN
W
i for both the residence and workplace. Let
Hi =
[
Xi B
R
i B
W
i A
R
i A
W
i Ci
]
βH =
[
βX βBR βBR βAR βAW βC
]′
T ∗i can now be modeled as:
T ∗i = α
RSNRi + α
WSNWi +HiβH + νi + εi (3.5)
where αR and αW are hypothesized to be positive, reflecting positive neighborhood peer
effects.
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Endogeneity
There are several sources of potential endogeneity. First, unobserved heterogeneity at the
tract level could result in biased estimates if it happens to be correlated with the social
influence measures. A particular unobserved feature of the neighborhood may be responsible
for increasing public transit use of everyone in the neighborhood, which would be reflected
in a higher transit use rate as well as a greater probability of an observed commuter being
a public transit user. In such a case, the estimated coefficients would be partially reflecting
the effect of these unobserved factors rather than the effect of social influence. Second,
neighborhood sorting may also lead to biased estimates. People with similar preferences or
characteristics may choose to live or work in the same neighborhoods, and these preferences
and characteristics may be responsible for their commute mode choices rather than social
influence. Third, exploring social influence gives rise to the reflection problem discussed by
Manski (1993).
The first two sources of potential endogeneity are the ones of concern for this analysis. The
third source, the reflection problem, is not a concern because the social influence variable of
interest is a field variable which is estimated for the all residents or workers in a given tract.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that it is unlikely that the commute mode choice of a
single commuter would affect the choices of everyone living or working in the neighborhood.
Although the analysis controls for a rich set of neighborhood and household characteristics,
the first two sources of potential endogeneity are still a concern because the control variables
may not capture everything. To address the potential endogeneity, an IV is constructed.
Instrumental Variable
The IV used is the weighted average of the Euclidean commute trip distance for every
neighborhood. In this paper, as in previous studies, the commute trip distance is a significant
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determinant of public transit use. It is reasonable to believe that the commute distance of
an individual’s neighbors or coworkers does not influence the individual’s choice of commute
mode except through its influence on the neighbors’ or coworkers’ choice of commute mode.
However, the commute distance itself of an individual may be correlated with that of the
neighbors or coworkers. Nevertheless, this does not affect the exclusion restriction of the IV
because the individual’s commute distance is in fact controlled for in the model. Therefore,
the weighted average of the commute distance of neighbors or coworkers is a suitable IV for
their public transit use.
The IV is constructed by using the LEHD Origin-Destination (OD) data. The LEHD OD
files provide the number of workers in each pair of home and work neighborhoods, where
each neighborhood is a census block. To construct the IV, the data are first aggregated
to the census tract level since this is the definition of the neighborhood in this study, and
then the destination tracts for each origin tract are identified. The Euclidean distance is
then computed between the centroid of the origin tract and each of the centroids of all the
associated destination tracts. Therefore, for every origin tract j, where j = 1, ..., J and J =
number of origin tracts, a Euclidean distance EDOj,kj is computed, where kj = 1, ..., Kj and
Kj = number of destination tracts paired with tract j. Thus, for each origin tract, there are
Kj associated Euclidean distances, ED
O
j,kj
.
A weighted average of these distances is then computed, with the weights being the corre-
sponding fraction of total commuters living in the origin tract and commuting to a given
destination tract. That is, for every origin tract j, weights, wOj,kj , for all destination tracts k
are computed, such that
wOj,kj =
workersOj,kj
workersOj
where workersOj is the total number of workers commuting from tract j, and workers
O
j,kj
is
the number of workers commuting from tract j to tract kj. The weighted average Euclidean
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distance for origin tracts, EDOj is then computed as:
EDOj =
Kj∑
kj=1
wOj,kj × EDOj,kj
Each origin tract now has a weighted average distance variable, which is used as an IV for the
residence tract transit use rate. Hence, ZRi , the IV for SN
R
i , is matched to the corresponding
EDOj , such that
ZRi = ED
O
j for R = O
The algorithm is repeated to construct an IV for the workplace social influence variable,
where the origin neighborhoods, jk, for each destination neighborhood, k, are identified,
and then the Euclidean distances, EDDk,jk , between each destination tract centroid and the
associated origin tracts centroids are computed. The weighted average of these distances,
EDDk , are then calculated, where the weights, w
D
k,jk
reflect the corresponding fraction of
total commuters working in the destination tract and commuting from a given origin tract.
Therefore,
wDk,jk =
workersDk,jk
workersDk
EDDk =
Jk∑
jk=1
wDk,jk × EDDk,jk
ZWi = ED
D
k for W = D
where workersDk is the total number of workers commuting to tract k, workers
D
k,jk
is the
number of workers commuting from tract jk to tract k, and Z
W
i is the IV for SN
W
i .
The model to be estimated is now:
T ∗i = SNiα+HiβH + νi + εi (3.6)
SN
′
i = ZiΠZ +HiΠH + νi + µi (3.7)
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where SNi =
[
SNRi SN
W
i
]
, α =
[
αR αW
]′
, Zi =
[
ZRi Z
W
i
]′
, ZRi and Z
W
i represent the
exogenous variables (the constructed average Euclidean commute distance) for the residence
and workplace tracts respectively, and Π represents the reduced form coefficients. The error
terms, εi and µi, are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, and the model is estimated
using Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
3.4.3 Income-Group Social Influence
Model
To estimate the effect of income-group social influence, the model builds on equation 3.5,
adding the income-group influence variables for the residence and workplace tracts YNRi and
YNWi , binary variables indicating whether the commuter has a household income above the
median household income of commuters in the corresponding tract and denoted by RICHRi
and RICHWi respectively, and interaction terms of the income-group influence variables and
the corresponding RICHi denoted by YN
R
i × RICHRi and YNWi × RICHWi . Therefore, to
explore the existence of income-group social influence in public transit use decisions, T ∗i is
modeled as:
T ∗i = SNiα+YNiγ+YNRICHiγr+RICHiδr+SNRICHiαr+HiβH+νi+εi (3.8)
where:
YNi =
[
YNRi YN
W
i
]
,
YNRICHi =
[
YNRi ×RICHRi YNWi ×RICHWi
]
,
RICHi =
[
RICHRi RICH
W
i
]
,
SNRICHi =
[
SNRi ×RICHRi SNWi ×RICHWi
]
,
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γr =
[
γRr γ
W
r
]′
,
γ =
[
γR γW
]′
,
δr =
[
δRr δ
W
r
]′
, and
αr =
[
αRr α
W
r
]′
.
Identification Strategy
The income-group social influence variable refers to the income-group within a specific tract,
whether the residence or workplace tract. Therefore, the income-group social influence vari-
able can be thought of as two-dimensional; one dimension being spatial, and the other
income-group-related. To ensure that γ and γr are in fact reflecting income-group social
influence, rather than also reflecting spatial social influence, the spatial social influence vari-
ables, SNi, are also included in the regression to control for social influence specific to the
neighborhoods.
There are three potential sources of identification threats: unobserved heterogeneity that is
income-group-specific, unobserved heterogeneity (or sorting) that is neighborhood-specific, or
unobserved heterogeneity that is specific to income groups in particular neighborhoods. The
third source could be thought of as the intersection of income-group-specific heterogeneity
with neighborhood-specific heterogeneity, since neighborhood-specific heterogeneity could
vary across the income groups.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity across income groups as well as potential bias that
may arise because of sorting into certain income groups, an income-group fixed effect is
included in the regression, which is represented by RICHi in equation 3.8. The presence
of SNi plays an additional role in that it controls for any unobserved heterogeneity across
tracts that impacts transit use, and captures potential neighborhood sorting bias promoting
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transit use. Therefore, SNi can be thought of as controlling for potential neighborhood-
specific heterogeneity promoting transit use. To account for the potential intersection of
neighborhood-specific and income-group-specific heterogeneity, an interaction term of the
income-group fixed effect and SNi is included in the estimation (SNRICHi). As a result,
the estimates for γ and γr are purged from neighborhood-related bias impacting transit
users, income-group-related bias, and bias specific to the combined effect of income and
neighborhood transit use. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that γ in fact reflects income-
group influence.
Interpretation
In equation 3.8, γ reflects the income-group influence for the poor group, defined as those
whose household income lies below the median household income of commuters in the relevant
tract. A higher median transit user income does not necessarily reflect increasing rich transit
use, but reflects increasing rich transit use relative to poor transit use. The distinction
between the impact on the rich and the poor is made using an interaction term. Note that
RICHi is defined twice: once relative to the median household income in the residence
tract, and another relative to that in the workplace tract. These two RICHi variables
are correlated, but are not necessarily equal. Moreover, the variable RICHi is not defined
relative to the median household income of transit users, which means that the definition
of RICHi does not vary as the median income of transit users varies. The income-group
influence for the rich commuters,
∂T ∗i
∂YNRi
and
∂T ∗i
∂YNWi
, are represented by γR + γRr and γ
W +
γWr . The γr reflects whether the effect on the rich group is significantly different from that
on the poor group. Therefore, γr can be negative or 0 and there would still be positive
income-group influence for the rich if γ + γr is still positive. In such a case, a negative γr
would only indicate that rich commuters are less responsive to the income-group influence
than the poor group.
85
The expectation is that
∂T ∗i
∂YNRi
≥ 0 and ∂T ∗i
∂YNWi
≥ 0 for rich commuters. That is, rich commuters
are expected to prefer to have more rich commuters relative to poor ones using transit (as
reflected by a higher Median Transit Income), and are unlikely to be inspired to use transit
when the poor transit user population increases in relative size (as would be reflected by a
lower Median Transit Income). However, the income-group influence for the poor group may
not necessarily work that way. It may be the case that poor commuters are more likely to use
transit the greater the percentage of transit users who are poor. In other words,
∂T ∗i
∂YNRi
≤ 0
and
∂T ∗i
∂YNWi
≤ 0 for the poor. That is, as the median income falls (in other words, more poor
relative to rich), more poor commuters are likely to use transit. On the other hand, the poor
may favor a more integrated transit system and respond to a higher median transit user
income by using transit as well. This would be reflected by
∂T ∗i
∂YNRi
> 0 and
∂T ∗i
∂YNWi
> 0 for the
poor. For the poor commuter, γR and γW represent
∂T ∗i
∂YNRi
and
∂T ∗i
∂YNWi
respectively.
3.4.4 Racial Social Influence
Model
The model for the racial social influence also builds on equation 3.5. The racial influence
variables RNRi and RN
W
i , for the residence and workplace respectively, are added to equation
3.5, and so are the interaction terms of these racial influence variables with the binary variable
WHITEi that indicates whether a commuter is white. The interaction terms are denoted
by RNRi ×WHITEi and RNWi ×WHITEi. T ∗i can, thus, be modeled as:
T ∗i = SNiα+RNiλ+WHITEi×RNiλwh+WHITEi×SNiαwh+HiβH +νi+εi (3.9)
where:
RNi =
[
RNRi RN
W
i
]
, λ =
[
λR λW
]′
, λwh =
[
λRwh λ
W
wh
]′
, and αwh =
[
αRwh α
W
wh
]′
.
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Identification Strategy
The identification strategy for racial social influence is identical to that for the income-
group social influence. There are three potential sources of identification threats: unob-
served heterogeneity that is race-group-specific, unobserved heterogeneity (or sorting) that
is neighborhood-specific, or unobserved heterogeneity that is specific to race groups in par-
ticular neighborhoods. Neighborhood-specific heterogeneity promoting transit users is con-
trolled for by the inclusion of the spatial influence measure, SNi, and race-group-specific
heterogeneity is controlled for by WHITEi, which can be thought of as a race-group fixed
effect. WHITEi is included in Hi. Heterogeneity specific to the intersection of the race-
group and the neighborhood is controlled for by the interaction of the race-group fixed effect,
WHITEi, and the spatial social influence measure, SNi. Therefore, λ and λwh represent
consistent estimates of racial social influence.
Interpretation
In general, the white commuters are expected to have preferences that are increasing in white
transit use if racial social influence exists. Therefore, the expectations are
∂T ∗i
∂RNRi
≥ 0 and
∂T ∗i
∂RNWi
≥ 0 for whites. The nonwhite commuters may also be expected to have preferences
that are increasing in nonwhite transit use, in which case
∂T ∗i
∂RNRi
≤ 0 and ∂T ∗i
∂RNWi
≤ 0 for the
nonwhite, but may also have preferences that are increasing in white transit use, in which
case
∂T ∗i
∂RNRi
> 0 and
∂T ∗i
∂RNWi
> 0 . The λR and λW in equation 3.9 represent the nonwhite
commuter’s
∂T ∗i
∂RNRi
and
∂T ∗i
∂RNWi
respectively. On the other hand, the white commuter’s
∂T ∗i
∂RNRi
and
∂T ∗i
∂RNWi
are computed as λR + λRwh and λ
W + λWwh respectively. As with income-group
influence, a negative λwh does not necessarily indicate a negative racial influence effect on
the white commuter.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Fundamental Determinants
The model is estimated with the fundamental determinants only first, before adding the
second-order effects of social influence. This step is done to gauge the model before intro-
ducing the new factors, and to take a closer look at the effect of variables that have not been
examined across several major US cities all at once, such as parking prices, gas expenses,
commute time difference, and rail transit access route distance. A binary probit model is es-
timated, where the binary depended variable is defined as in equation 3.2 and T ∗ by equation
3.4. The average marginal effects are presented in Table 3.5.
Household income is a statistically significant determinant of public transit use. The results
indicate that a $10,000 increase in household income reduces the probability of transit use
by 0.17 percentage points. This is consistent with the literature and expectations about
people’s response to higher income. As income increases, commuters tend to switch to the
more expensive mode. An increase in household size also reduces a commuter’s probability
of using transit. The probability of transit use drops by 0.77 percentage points with every
additional household member. The effect does not exist in CA, though, but is larger in
NY-NJ and MA, where an additional household member reduces the probability of public
transit use by 1.4 percentage points. This is likely to be the case because a bigger household
is more likely to involve children who may need to be driven around.
Age is also statistically significant, and an additional year of age reduces the probability
of using public transit use by 0.08 percentage points. Examining the individual samples,
though, it seems that age is insignificant in the CA sample. White commuters are 2.8
percentage points less likely to use transit, holding everything else constant. This effect is
absent in the CA sample, but is stronger in NY-NJ where the marginal effect is 4.2 percentage
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Transit Use (Eq. 3.4)
Dependent Variable: Ti Full CA NY-NJ MA
Socioeconomic Characteristics, Xi
Income -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0027*** -0.0014**
Household Size -0.0077*** 0.0029 -0.0141*** -0.0137***
Age -0.0008*** -0.0004 -0.0005* -0.0017***
White -0.0282*** -0.0106 -0.0420*** -0.0257*
Female -0.0034 0.0084 0.0058 -0.0298***
Neighborhood Characteristics, Bi
Population DensityR 4.7227*** 4.0244*** 3.8132*** 6.3553***
Population DensityW 2.3899*** 3.8219*** 1.4180*** 3.5031***
Job DensityR 0.4190** 0.2688 1.2801*** 0.3646*
Job DensityW 0.3697*** 1.0094*** 0.3747*** 0.1940***
Commuter White RateR -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004** 0.0006**
Commuter White RateW -0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0016***
Median Commuter IncomeR -0.0001 -0.0023 0.0024* -0.0025
Median Commuter IncomeW 0.0040*** 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0266***
Transit Access Ai
Distance to RailR -0.0026** -0.0020** -0.0061** -0.0200***
Distance to RailW -0.0059*** -0.0020* -0.0214*** -0.0800***
Trip Characteristics, Ci
Distance 0.0065*** 0.0029*** 0.0051*** 0.0088***
Time Difference -0.0022*** -0.0017*** -0.0022*** -0.0023***
Parking Price 0.0202*** 0.0096*** 0.0238*** 0.0172***
Gas Expense 0.0199*** 0.0522*** 0.0241*** 0.0081*
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Observations 20068 8075 6452 5541
Pseudo-R2 0.4785 0.3177 0.5798 0.4109
Wald χ2 4523 910 2286 1026
Log Likelihood -5515 -1874 -1803 -1615
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
A constant is included
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points instead. Women are less likely to use public transit in MA only, where the probability
of transit use drops by 3 percentage points. Overall, though, gender is not a significant
determinant of transit use.
Population density, a standard urban form measure, is significant at both the workplace
and residence. For every additional person per 100 square-meter in the residence tract, the
probability of transit use increases by 4.7 percentage points, whereas the same increase in
the workplace tract leads to an increase in probability of 2.4 percentage points. The results
are significant across all samples, but the size of the marginal effect varies, going to as high
as 6.4 percentage points for residence tracts in MA. Furthermore, job density is a significant
determinant of transit use. For every extra job per 100 square-meter in the residence tract,
the probability of transit use increases by 0.42 percentage points, whereas the same increase
in the workplace tract raises the probability of using transit by 0.37 percentage points.
For workplace job density, the results are significant across the individual samples, and the
marginal effects range from 0.19 percentage points in MA to 1.01 in CA for every additional
job per 100 square-meter. Job density in the residence tract, however, is insignificant in CA.
For the full sample, racial composition of the commuting population in the residence tract is
not a significant determinant of public transit use. However, this results does not hold for all
individual samples. For example, a 1 percentage point increase of white commuters in the
residence tract reduces the probability of public transit use in NY-NJ by no more than 0.04
percentage points, while increasing the probability in MA by 0.06 percentage points. The
negative marginal effect for the NY-NJ sample implies that in neighborhoods with a greater
percentage of white commuters, an individual commuter is less likely to use public transit
regardless of his or her own race. This is not surprising since we have already seen that white
commuters are less likely to use public transit. However, the estimates for the MA sample
may imply that, in MA, a more racially homogeneous residential neighborhood encourages
public transit use. On the other hand, a 1 percentage point increase in the workplace tract
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reduces transit use probability in the full sample by 0.05 percentage points. The result does
not seem to hold for the CA and NY-NJ samples, though.
The findings on the impact of overall income level of commuters in a neighborhood on public
transit use are mixed. For the residential neighborhood, overall income of commuters does
not affect public transit use. The only exception shows up in the NY-NJ results, where
an additional $10,000 in median commuter household income raises the probability of using
transit by 0.2 percentage points. Examining the results for the workplace neighborhood
commuter income level reveals that, overall, a higher income level increases the probability
of public transit use by 0.4 percentage points for every additional $10,000. This result,
however, does not hold across the individual samples. The MA sample is the only individual
sample for which commuter income in the workplace tract is significant. In fact, a $10,000
increase in commuter income raises the probability of transit use by 2.7 percentage points.
The longer the access route to the nearest rail transit station, the less likely a commuter
is to use public transit. The evidence suggests that for every additional half-mile from
the residence, the probability of using transit drops by 0.13 percentage points. Although
the results are significant across all samples, the marginal effect can go up to as high as 1
percentage points (MA) for the same increase in access route distance. The workplace rail
transit access distance seems to matter more than the residence one, with probability falling
by 0.27 percentage point with every additional half-mile. The effect holds across all samples.
The marginal effect for the MA sample is largest in magnitude, and is in fact 4 percentage
points for an additional half-mile of rail transit station access distance.
Distance to work is highly significant in every sample. The evidence suggests that for every
additional mile, the probability of using public transit increases by 0.65 percentage points.
The magnitude of the marginal effect varies across the individual samples, with a minimum
of a 0.29 percentage points in CA and a maximum of 0.88 in MA. On the other hand, every
extra minute on public transit (relative to driving time) reduces the probability of transit use
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by 0.2 percentage points. The result is significant and consistent across all samples, which
signifies the importance of the time cost associated with many public transit trips.
Both parking prices and gas expenses are significant across all samples. The evidence suggests
that a 10% increase in either gas expenses or daily parking prices leads to a 0.2 percentage
point increase in the probability of using public transit. Nevertheless, the magnitudes of
the marginal effects of the two costs vary across samples. Gas expenses seem to have the
largest effect in the CA sample, with a marginal effect associated with a 10% increase goes
as high as 0.52 percentage points, and the smallest in the MA sample, with a marginal effect
of just 0.08 percentage points. Parking prices, on the other hand, have the largest marginal
effect in the NY-NJ sample, where a 10% increase raises the probability of transit use by
0.24 percentage points, and the lowest marginal effect in the CA sample, with an increase of
transit use probability by only 0.1 percentage points. The discrepancy between the results
for parking prices marginal effects in the CA and NY-NJ sample is largely due to the fact
that the average daily parking price in NY-NJ is much higher than that in CA.
This paper does not attempt to address potential endogeneity that may be associated with
some of the examined variables. Some of the estimates may be biased because of sorting, but
one way of looking at the results is that they represent short-run marginal effects. Another
way would be viewing the magnitudes of these estimates as upper limits to the effect of these
variables, assuming that the bias would lead to the overestimation of these effects. In any
case, these results are not necessarily meant to determine causality, but are meant to give an
overview of the predictors of public transit use prior to the introduction of social influence
effects.
92
3.5.2 Spatial Social Influence
To explore the role of spatial influence in transit use, a binary probit model is estimated,
where the binary depended model is defined as in equation 3.2 and T ∗ as in equation 3.5. The
results are presented in Table 3.6. The marginal effects of spatial social influence measures
are significant for both the workplace and residential tracts, as can be seen in Table 3.6.
The spatial social influence measure is defined as the percentage of transit users in a given
tract. The results suggest that the impact of the workplace social influence is larger than
that of the residential one. A 1 percentage point increase in transit use in the workplace
tract is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in transit use probability, whereas
the same increase in the residential tract is associated with a 0.15 percentage point increase.
The results are highly statistically significant (0.1% level), and consistent throughout all
individual samples.
The estimates for the other determinants are generally robust, except for the density mea-
sures and financial costs associated with the commute trip. The magnitude of the marginal
effects drop across all samples. The marginal effect of parking prices, although still statisti-
cally significant, is now less than half what it was before the inclusion of the spatial network
effect. Now a 10% increase in parking prices is associated with a 0.08 percentage point in-
crease in the transit use probability instead of the 0.2 percentage point increase estimated
by equation 3.4. Gas prices, on the other hand, become insignificant in the MA sample, but
are still statistically significant for all other samples. For the full sample, a 10% increase in
gas expenses is associated with a 0.1 percentage point increase in the probability of transit
use.
To address potential endogeneity the model is estimated once more but using an IV as
described in the previous section. The results are reported in Table 3.7. The table also
reports the results for the exogeneity test, where the null hypothesis is that spatial influence
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Table 3.6: Spatial Social Influence: Transit Use Rate (Eq. 3.5)
Dependent Variable: Ti Full CA NY-NJ MA
Spatial Social Influence, SNi
Transit Use RateR 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0012*** 0.0018***
Transit Use RateW 0.0039*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0047***
Socioeconomic Characteristics, Xi
Income -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0031*** -0.0019***
Household Size -0.0062*** 0.002 -0.0121*** -0.0107***
Age -0.0007*** -0.0004* -0.0004 -0.0016***
White -0.0264*** -0.0084 -0.0455*** -0.0246*
Female 0.0005 0.0112* 0.0069 -0.0256***
Neighborhood Characteristics, Bi
Population DensityR 1.1208*** -0.2688 1.2763*** 1.084
Population DensityW -0.6638** 0.0405 -0.6435** 0.7558
Job Density R 0.1183 -0.4794 0.5986* 0.1624
Job DensityW 0.0888*** 0.3292** 0.0608 0.0795**
Commuter White RateR 0 0.0003* -0.0003 0.0007***
Commuter White RateW 0.0004* 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003
Median Commuter IncomeR -0.0002 -0.0029** 0.0030** -0.0017
Median Commuter IncomeW 0.0040*** 0.0007 0.0047* 0.0148***
Transit Access, Ai
Distance to RailR -0.0022** -0.0014* -0.0054** -0.0152***
Distance to RailW -0.0033*** -0.0015 -0.0101*** -0.0381***
Trip Characteristics, Ci
Distance 0.0053*** 0.0025*** 0.0043*** 0.0074***
Time Difference -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0014***
Parking Price 0.0075*** 0.0042*** 0.0076*** 0.0068***
Gas Expense 0.0109*** 0.0458*** 0.0131*** 0.0023
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Observations 20068 8075 6452 5541
Pseudo-R2 0.5216 0.3524 0.6188 0.4473
Wald χ2 5143 1031 2486 1220
Log Likelihood -5059 -1779 -1636 -1515
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
A constant is included
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Table 3.7: IV Results (Eq.3.7 )
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Ti Full CA NY-NJ MA
Spatial Social Influence, SNi
Transit Use RateR 0.0015 0.0015 0.0011 0.0018
Transit Use RateW 0.0038*** 0.0033* 0.0036*** 0.0046
Socioeconomic Characteristics, Xi
Income -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0031*** -0.0019***
Household Size -0.0061*** 0.002 -0.0121*** -0.0105***
Age -0.0007*** -0.0004** -0.0004 -0.0016***
White -0.0267*** -0.0088 -0.0456*** -0.0249**
Female 0.0007 0.0118** 0.0069 -0.0250***
Neighborhood Characteristics, Bi
Population DensityR 1.1034 -0.3406 1.2701 0.971
Population DensityW -0.5885 0.4691 -0.6275 0.7734
Job DensityR 0.1191 -0.5019 0.6136 0.1585
Job DensityW 0.0878 0.2816 0.0599 0.0847
Commuter White RateR 0 0.0003* -0.0003 0.0007*
Commuter White RateW 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001
Median Commuter IncomeR -0.0002 -0.0029*** 0.0030** -0.0017
Median Commuter IncomeW 0.0040*** 0.0007 0.0044 0.0149**
Transit Access, Ai
Distance to RailR -0.0022** -0.0013 -0.0053** -0.0149***
Distance to RailW -0.0033*** -0.0016* -0.0103** -0.0390***
Trip Characteristics, Ci
Distance 0.0052*** 0.0025*** 0.0043*** 0.0075***
Time Difference -0.0013*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** -0.0014***
Parking Price 0.0075*** 0.0041 0.0076 0.007
Gas Expense 0.0109*** 0.0454*** 0.0130*** 0.0018
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Observations 20068 8075 6452 5541
Wald χ2 6328.26 1390.41 2561.77 1749.16
Wald Exogeneity Test
χ2 3.7 3.37 0.78 2.69
p-value 0.157 0.1855 0.6786 0.2603
First-Stage: Residence
F-stat 2088.44 497.22 1045.73 543.28
Adjusted-R2 0.7374 0.6058 0.7728 0.6727
First-Stage: Workplace
F-stat 3527.51 646.31 2259.6 894.72
Adjusted-R2 0.8259 0.6665 0.8803 0.7721
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
A constant is included
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Table 3.8: IV Results for Full sample (all vs. limited controls)
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Ti All controls Limited controls
Spatial Social Influence, SNi
Transit Use RateR 0.0015 0.0015**
Transit Use RateW 0.0038*** 0.0058***
Socioeconomic Characteristics, Xi
Income -0.0021*** -0.0016***
Household Size -0.0061*** -0.0079***
Age -0.0007*** -0.0009***
White -0.0267*** -0.0246***
Female 0.0007 -0.0056
Neighborhood Characteristics, Bi
Population DensityR 1.1034
Population DensityW -0.5885
Job DensityR 0.1191
Job DensityW 0.0878
Commuter White RateR 0
Commuter White RateW 0.0003
Median Commuter IncomeR -0.0002
Median Commuter IncomeW 0.0040***
Transit Access, Ai
Distance to RailR -0.0022**
Distance to RailW -0.0033***
Trip Characteristics, Ci
Distance 0.0052***
Time Difference -0.0013***
Parking Price 0.0075***
Gas Expense 0.0109***
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 20068 20542
Wald χ2 6328.26 3257.26
Wald Exogeneity Test
χ2 3.7 17.04
p-value 0.157 0.0002
First-Stage: Residence
F-stat 2088.44 575.9
Adjusted-R2 0.7374 0.2668
First-Stage: Workplace
F-stat 3527.51 726.76
Adjusted-R2 0.8259 0.3147
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
A constant is included
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(Transit Use Rate) is exogenous, as well as the first-stage F-statistics and adjusted-R2. The
findings reveal several things. The first result to note is that the first-stage F-statistics
indicate that the instruments cannot be classified as weak instruments. The F-statistic is
2088 for the full sample, and is the lowest for the CA sample at 497. The second result to
note is that, whereas the residence tract spatial influence is no longer significant (Transit Use
RateR), the workplace tract one is still statistically significant for all the samples except the
MA sample. For the full sample, a 1 percentage point increase in transit use by coworkers
results in a 0.38 percentage point increase in the probability of transit use. The third result
to note is that the marginal effects are identical to the non-IV estimates. This suggests that
the non-IV estimates are in fact consistent estimates, since the IV estimation produces the
same marginal effects.
The fourth result to note is the exogeneity test. According to the Wald exogeneity test we
fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for all the samples. This indicates that the loss
of efficiency associated with the IV estimation is outweighing any benefit in terms of bias.
Together with the third results noted, this finding suggests that endogeneity may not be a
serious concern, given the rich set of factors that are jointly controlled for, and that there
are no gains associated with IV estimation even though the IV used is a relevant instrument.
Specification (2) in Table 3.8 elaborates on this point.
Table 3.8 presents the results with a complete set of control variables for the full sample in
specification (1). This is the same as specification (1) from Table 3.7. Specification (2) in
Table 3.8, on the other hand, estimates the model using the IV but keeping out most of the
control variables. The only variables kept are the socioeconomic ones. As ca be seen, the
exogeneity test reveals that the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected. Both the residence
and workplace spatial influence measures are now significant. Comparing the evidence from
specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3.8 it seems that the rich set of control variables included
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in the model succeeds in capturing most heterogeneity that would be correlated with spatial
influence.
3.5.3 Income-Group Social Influence
To explore the role of income-group social influence in transit use, a binary probit model
is estimated, where the binary depended model is defined as in equation 3.2 and where T ∗
is defined by equation 3.8. The average marginal effects are presented in Table 3.9. The
results strongly support the hypothesis of a positive impact of Median Transit Income on a
rich commuter’s decision to use transit. Although both are statistically significant, the size
of the marginal effect of income-group influence in the workplace tract is larger than that of
the residence. The evidence suggests that, whereas the poor’s propensity to use transit is
unaffected by the Median Transit Income, a $10,000 increase in Median Transit Income in
the residence tract raises the probability of the rich commuter by 0.2 percentage points, and
the same increase in the workplace tract raises the probability by 0.7 percentage points.
The results of the individual samples vary to some extent. For example, the Median Transit
Income has no significant effect on neither rich nor poor commuters’ decision to use transit
in CA. In MA, the results hold only for the workplace, and fail to hold for the residence,
implying that income-group social influence may exist only among coworkers over there. The
NY-NJ results tell a more complex story. It is not merely the case that poor commuters are
unaffected by the Median Transit Income, but are rather negatively influenced by it in the
residence tracts. A $10,000 increase in Median Transit Income in the residence tract reduces
a poor commuter’s probability of using transit by 0.48 percentage points. This finding points
to peer effects among the poor. The interaction term for the richer commuters is significant
and thus the effect different from that among the poor commuters. Adding up the marginal
effects to compute that of Median Transit Income on the rich commuter in the residence
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Table 3.9: Income-Group Social Influence: Median Transit Income (Eq. 3.8)
Dependent Variable: Ti Full CA NY-NJ MA
Spatial Social Influence, SNi
Transit Use RateR 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0016*** 0.0031***
Transit Use RateW 0.0038*** 0.0029*** 0.0032*** 0.0060***
Interactions: SNRICHi
SNRi ×RICHRi -0.0008*** -0.0010* -0.0003 -0.001
SNWi ×RICHWi 0.0008*** 0.0013** 0.0013*** -0.0006
Income-Group Social Influence, YNi
Transit Median IncomeR -0.0005 0.0019 -0.0048*** 0.0036
Transit Median IncomeW -0.0001 0.0013 -0.0037 -0.0037
Interactions: YNRICHi
YNRi ×RICHRi 0.0022* 0.0019 0.0065*** -0.0054*
YNWi ×RICHWi 0.0070*** 0.0015 0.0114*** 0.0101**
RICHi
RICHRi -0.0360** -0.0318 -0.0897*** 0.0666
RICHWi -0.0565*** -0.0162 -0.1192*** -0.0463
Socioeconomic Characteristics, Xi
Income -0.0020*** -0.0015 -0.0030** -0.0030**
Household Size -0.0070*** 0.0037 -0.0123*** -0.0138***
Age -0.0008*** -0.0005* -0.0004 -0.0021***
White -0.0299*** -0.007 -0.0491*** -0.0254
Female 0.0044 0.0168** 0.0111 -0.0330***
Neighborhood Characteristics, Bi
Population DensityR 1.3146*** 0.1495 1.3648*** 2.4133
Population DensityW -0.6439* 0.0969 -0.6617* 0.4831
Job DensityR 0.1958 -0.0386 0.8075* 0.2615
Job DensityW 0.1088*** 0.3254** 0.0719 0.0962**
Commuter White RateR 0.0001 0.0007*** -0.0002 0.0010***
Commuter White RateW 0.0006** 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005
Median Commuter IncomeR -0.0028* -0.0091*** 0.0036 -0.0028
Median Commuter IncomeW 0.003 -0.0007 0.0051 0.0199***
Transit Access, Ai
Distance to RailR -0.0027** -0.0013 -0.0054** -0.0228***
Distance to RailW -0.0034** -0.0016 -0.0128*** -0.0598***
Trip Characteristics, Ci
Distance 0.0059*** 0.0025*** 0.0053*** 0.0105***
Time Difference -0.0016*** -0.0014*** -0.0015*** -0.0024***
Parking Price 0.0090*** 0.0053*** 0.0083*** 0.0087***
Gas Expense 0.0181*** 0.0511*** 0.0125** 0.0144*
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Observations 14937 5930 5303 3704
Pseudo-R2 0.5038 0.3642 0.5938 0.3935
Wald χ2 4268 958 2052 943.7831
Log Likelihood -4387 -1462 -1483 -1308
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
A constant is included
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tract reveals that a $10,000 increase raises the probability that a rich commuter uses transit
by 0.2 percentage points. On the other hand, the same increase in the workplace tract leads
to a 1.1 percentage point increase in transit use probability by the rich.
The RICHi variables, which are income-group specific fixed effects, are statistically signif-
icant in the full sample and indicate that having an income exceeding the median income
level of commuters in the tract reduces the probability of using transit by 3.6 percentage
points in the residence tract, and by 5.7 percentage points in the workplace tract. This re-
sult, however, does not hold across all samples. The NY-NJ sample is the only sample that
also produces statistically significant estimates for RICHi, and the marginal effects are of a
larger magnitude. The SNRICHi interaction terms indicate that there are some differences
in the responsiveness of the rich to the Transit Use Rate in the corresponding tract. The
rich are less responsive to the spatial influence in the residence tract, yet more responsive in
the workplace tract. This result holds for the CA sample as well. For the NY-NJ sample,
the same results hold for the workplace tract, but for the residence tract, the rich seem to be
as responsive to spatial influence as the poor. These interaction terms capture any further
tract-specific heterogeneity that affects transit use and that is income-group-specific.
3.5.4 Racial Social Influence
To explore the role of racial social influence in transit use, a binary probit model is estimated,
where the binary depended variable is defined as in equation 3.2 and where T ∗ is defined
by equation 3.9. The average marginal effects are presented in Table 3.10. The results that
emerge indicate that there are peer effects among the nonwhite group in the workplace, where
the probability of transit use by a nonwhite commuter increases as the percentage of white
transit users falls, i.e., the percentage of nonwhite commuters rises. Since the interaction
term of the WHITEi variable with the Transit White Rate of the workplace is positive
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Table 3.10: Racial Social Influence: Transit White Rate (Eq. 3.9)
Dependent Variable: Ti Full CA NY-NJ MA
Spatial Social Influence, SNi
Transit Use RateR 0.0018*** 0.0016*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*
Transit Use RateW 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0027*** 0.0048***
Interactions: WHITEi × SNi
WHITEi × SNRi -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0008
WHITEi × SNWi 0.0009*** 0.0001 0.0018*** 0.0007
Racial Social Influence, RNi
Transit White RateR -0.0001 -0.0002 0 0.0005
Transit White RateW -0.0004** -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005
Interactions: WHITEi ×RNi
WHITEi ×RNRi 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002
WHITEi ×RNWi 0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005
Socioeconomic Characteristics, Xi
Income -0.0023*** -0.0022*** -0.0032*** -0.0025***
Household Size -0.0071*** 0.0041 -0.0125*** -0.0109***
Age -0.0008*** -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0018***
WHITEi -0.0693*** -0.0145 -0.1346*** -0.0857*
Female 0.0023 0.0163** 0.0099 -0.0291***
Neighborhood Characteristics, Bi
Population DensityR 1.1948*** -0.4762 1.2120*** 1.6236
Population DensityW -0.6322** -0.1883 -0.4589 0.3885
Job DensityR 0.1249 -0.2052 0.6107* 0.1819
Job DensityW 0.1022*** 0.3154** 0.0698 0.0954**
Commuter White RateR 0 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0004
Commuter White RateW 0.0007*** 0.0005 0.0010** 0.0004
Median Commuter IncomeR 0 -0.0029 0.0031** -0.0018
Median Commuter IncomeW 0.0037** -0.0014 0.004 0.0160***
Transit Access, Ai
Distance to RailR -0.0047*** -0.0031** -0.0056** -0.0183***
Distance to RailW -0.0046*** -0.0026* -0.0111*** -0.0469***
Trip Characteristics, Ci
Distance 0.0060*** 0.0037*** 0.0047*** 0.0088***
Time Difference -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0016***
Parking Price 0.0086*** 0.0048*** 0.0081*** 0.0077***
Gas Expense 0.0116*** 0.0418*** 0.0129*** 0.0047
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Observations 16338 5648 5990 4700
Pseudo-R2 0.5172 0.3505 0.6114 0.4228
Wald χ2 4528 775 2318 1077
Log Likelihood -4487 -1337 -1574 -1451
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
A constant is included
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and almost equal in magnitude, then the white commuters are not affected in any way by
the percentage of white coworkers or white neighbors using transit. Both the effects for
white and nonwhite commuters are statistically insignificant across all individual samples.
The results from the full sample shoud be itnerpreted with caution since the definition of
nonwhite is different across the various MSAs, and is therefore not necessarily referring to
one homogeneous group of people. It is also worth noting that it seems that the white
commuters are more responsive to spatial social influence than the nonwhite commuters; a
result that does not hold for either CA or MA.
3.5.5 Robustness
The results are largely robust to several variations. The results are robust to the inclusion of
extra variables such as land use mix, number of rail transit stations, and pedestrian-oriented
intersection density, for both the workplace and residence. Other neighborhood characteris-
tics, such as the unemployment rate, gini coefficient, and the percentage of residents below
the age of 18, have been added to the model for robustness but did not affect the findings.
The dataset has been further restricted to observations that had an access to rail transit
in the residence tract of less than 5 miles, and the results still hold. The dataset has been
expanded to include all observations from the RHTS and MTS datasets regardless of the
MSA, and the results are still robust.
3.6 Implications
Overall, the evidence that emerges from the analysis implies that there exists significant
spatial social influence, and that spatial social influence among coworkers, or coworker peer
effects, are consistently larger than those among neighbors. These findings have several
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implications. One implication is that exogenous increases in other determinants that increase
ridership would have indirect cascading effects through spatial social influence. For example,
if gas taxes or parking prices increase, public transit use will increase. The effect would not
stop at the direct effect of gas expenses or parking prices, but rather would have indirect
effects as well through the spatial social influence where the individual commuter is motivated
further to use transit because other neighbors or coworkers are using it. Another implication
is that exogenous changes or policies that target the workplace would have a bigger impact
than the ones that would target the residence. All workers are also residents, and when
public transit use in the workplace rises then so does public transit use in the residence
tract, which would amplify the effects. Nevertheless, targeting workplaces is more effective
because the policy or change would have a greater initial effect which would then propagate
to the residence locations. A third implication is that any changes initiating from social
influence of income-groups would be amplified further by the spatial social influence.
The evidence further suggests that income-group social influence plays a significant role for
the rich. The results indicate that rich commuters prefer to use public transit when other
rich commuters do so, everything else constant. Such evidence suggests that policymakers
should focus on setting policies that would encourage the rich to use transit. As more rich
commuters use public transit, the median transit user income rises, and as a result more rich
commuters opt for public transit because of the income-group social influence channel. As a
result, the median transit user income rises further. The rise in median transit user income
does not reduce the transit use of the poor, but increases transit use by the rich. Because
the rich are not crowding out the poor, the transit use rate must increase, everything else
constant. As a result, more poor and rich increase their transit use because of the spatial
social influence channel this time, amplifying the effect of the policy that initially targeted
the rich. Therefore, a multiplier effect plays out through both the income-group and spatial
social influence channels.
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On the other hand, a policy that targets rich and poor equally, would likely have an indirect
multiplier effect through the spatial social influence channel only. Alternatively, consider a
policy that would only target the poor, since they are the group more likely to use transit,
as evidenced by the estimates for the Income and RICHi variables. As the transit use rate
rises initially there will be positive spatial peer effects. However, since the poor transit user
population increases relative to the rich one, the median transit user income drops. As a
result, rich commuters become less likely to use public transit because of the income-group
social influence channel. Depending on the relative sizes of the changes, a policy targeting
only the poor could end up reducing overall transit use rate.
The evidence also provides insight on what exogenous changes in the median income of
all commuters in the residence or workplace neighborhoods would lead to. These changes
could be the result of shifting demographics, where neighborhoods are becoming richer,
for instance. An increase in the median income of all commuters in the residence tract
is likely to be associated with a drop in the probability of transit use through the direct
effect presented by the neighborhood characteristic variable, Median Commuter Income.
The exogenous increase in Median Commuter Income is likely to be accompanied by an
increase in Median Transit Income. The increase of the Median Transit Income will only
be a fraction of the increase in Median Commuter Income. The results in Table 3.9 show
that the estimate for the Median Commuter Income in the residence tract is roughly equal
in magnitude, but opposite in direction, to the income-group social influence effect for the
residence (0.22 percentage points). Since the change in the Median Transit Income is less
than that in Median Commuter Income, the overall initial effect will be negative. The total
effect may still be positive if the social multiplier effect outweighs the negative direct impact
of a higher Median Commuter Income. Thus, an increase in Median Commuter Income,
holding everything else constant, is likely to, but not necessarily, lead to a lower probability
of a given commuter using transit, whether rich or poor.
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On the other hand, an exogenous increase in Median Commuter Income in the workplace
has no direct effect on the decision to use transit, but an accompanying increase in Median
Transit Income would lead to higher probabilities of transit use by the rich through the
income-group peer effects for the rich. Therefore, we can conclude that a higher Median
Commuter Income in the residence tract may reduce the probability of transit use, holding
everything else constant, while a higher Median Commuter Income in the workplace tract
would increase the probability of transit use, holding everything else constant.
Another important implication of the results on social influence is that there is no evidence
of the presence of racial social influence. This statement holds across samples and regardless
of race. Although the full sample shows some racial social influence effects among minority
coworkers, these results may be questionable because of the varying constituency of the mi-
nority population across states. Such findings indicate that commuters are really influenced
in their decisions regarding transit use by income-groups rather than racial groups, and what
seems to some that commuters may be avoiding transit because of dominance by minorities
may really just be income-group social influence in action, but is confused with racial social
influence because the minority transit users usually also happen to also be poor transit users.
Some other implications of the findings relate to other determinants. For instance, the
marginal effect of the population density falls once the spatial social influence measures are
included. This may imply that part of the density’s importance in commute mode choice
really spurs from it’s correlation with spatial social influence measures. In models that do
not account for social influence the effects are being picked up to an extent by the density
measures. Another implication is related to parking prices. This study is the first to look
at parking prices across many cities. Although statistically significant, the marginal effect
of parking prices is relatively small. However, there is reason to believe that this estimate
is a lower bound estimate for the marginal effect of parking prices due to the presence of
Employer-Paid parking fringe benefits which are unaccounted for in this study. Khordagui
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(2017) discusses this further and explains why we should think of this estimate as a lower
bound in this case. Nevertheless, the estimates obtained here still imply that parking pricing
can be used as a policy that targets workplaces in particular. Other regulations aimed at
employers, such as those designed to incentivize transit use or discourage driving in general,
would be policies specifically targeting workplaces and hence benefit from the added influence
of peer effects.
3.7 Conclusion
The paper explores the underlying fundamental determinants of public transit use and in-
troduces the role of social influence, where a social group is defined across three different
dimensions: space, income, and race. The analysis makes use of a unique dataset specifically
built for the purpose of testing for all the effects across major US cities and surrounding
areas, and drawing on data from various sources, using various techniques such as GIS and
webscraping. The paper exploits the availability of census tract locations to construct vari-
ables and explore the effects in both the workplace and residence locations. To overcome
potential endogeneity of spatial social influence, a novel IV is constructed, and is found to
be a suitable instrument. The IV is the weighted average distance of commute trip distances
of a particular tract, whether residence or workplace, computed from OD data. The first-
stage F-statistics indicate that the IV is not weak. The exogeneity test indicates that the
null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected when using the IV method. Estimating
the model once more while leaving out most of the control variables results in rejecting the
null hypothesis of exogeneity. The evidence suggests that the wide array of control variables
included in the model account for heterogeneity correlated with the spatial influence mea-
sures. An alternative identification strategy is employed for the estimation of income-group
and racial social influence, where income and race group fixed effects control for income- and
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race-specific heterogeneity, tract transit use rate controls for tract-specific heterogeneity im-
pacting transit use, and an interaction term of both controls for tract-specific heterogeneity
impacting transit use and is income- or racial-specific.
The results of the fundamental determinants model are largely in line with expectations and
previous findings. The findings also suggest that social influence plays a role in the decision
to use transit, after controlling for a rich set of transit use determinants, and after addressing
endogeneity. Social influence among coworkers is relatively more influential than that among
neighbors. Furthermore, income-group social influence is particularly relevant for the richer
commuters. Theses findings allow policymakers to understand how changing demographics
could have cascading effects on transit use, and sheds light on groups that can be targeted
to encourage increased ridership. According to the findings of this paper, it is best to target
workplace social groups, and target richer commuters. Policies that encourage transit use
by these groups would eventually increase transit use by all groups through an indirect
multiplier effect. Furthermore, the findings introduce a new dimension to the implications
of changing demographics within a city. For instance, as residential neighborhoods become
richer it is likely that public transit use will fall, but as workplace neighborhoods become
richer the probability that a rich commuter uses transit increases, which would lead to a
cascading effect through both income-group and spatial social influence.
A major limitation of this study is that the dataset is cross-sectional, and that limits the
ability to model how these effects could play out over time. Nevertheless, it highlights the
importance of social influence, and compares the fundamental factors associated with transit
use across different cities, which is a good starting to point to encourage further research
in the area. Further research could examine the dynamics of the impact of social influence
on transit use, and examine the social multiplier effect. Tipping points are likely to exist as
well, and this could be an area of investigation. Furthermore, future research could examine
racial social influence for nonwhite subgroups to better understand its dynamics in transit
107
use. Other definitions of social influence could also be investigated, while also exploring the
existence of education-based or occupation-based social influence. Another line of research
could distinguish between, the effects on bus and rail transit use, possibly using a multinomial
discrete choice model. Overall, social influence is understudied in the commute mode choice
literature and there is a lot of room to expand on the current research to develop a more
solid understanding of the topic and its implications.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Data & Sources
Table A.1: List of counties
Alameda Marin San Bernardino Santa Barbara Stanislaus
Contra Costa Merced San Diego Santa Clara Yolo
Fresno Orange San Francisco Santa Cruz
Humboldt Placer San Joaquin Shasta
Kern Riverside San Luis Obispo Solano
Los Angeles Sacramento San Mateo Sonoma
A.2 Selected Variables
Most of those who pay for parking in this sample live in 4 counties: Los Angeles (32%),
San Francisco (21%), Alameda (15%), and Sacramento (8%). Overall, 3.4% of those who
drive alone report paying for parking. Sacramento tops the list with 13% of commuting
drivers paying for parking, followed by San Francisco, where 11% of commuting drivers pay
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Table A.2: Transit station / stop sources
County Source
Alameda Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Contra Costa Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Fresno TransitLand
Humboldt TransitLand
Kern TransitLand
Los Angeles Los Angeles Metro Developer & TransitLand
Marin Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Merced TransitLand
Orange Orange County Transportation Authority
Placer Sacramento Area Government of Councils
Riverside TransitLand
Sacramento Sacramento Area Government of Councils
San Bernardino TransitLand
San Diego San Diego’s Regional Planning Agency
San Francisco Metropolitan Transportation Commission
San Joaquin TransitLand (San Joaquin RTD)
San Luis Obispo Digitized from map on SLOcity.org
San Mateo Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Santa Barbara TransitLand
Santa Clara Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Santa Cruz TransitLand
Shasta TransitLand
Solano Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Sonoma Metropolitan Transportation Commission
Stanislaus TransitLand
Yolo Sacramento Area Government of Councils
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for parking. Of those who drive to work, 81% report parking at the destination location,
followed by a 7.25% parking on-street, and 10% parking at an off-site parking facility.
Parking prices reported in the dataset vary in units; 49% pay parking on a monthly basis,
and 31% report paying on a daily basis. Therefore, a daily price is constructed for each
individual based on the reported data. The typical number of hours per day of work is
computed from the reported number of work-hours per week and the number of days worked
per week, which is then used to determine daily parking price for each individual. The
distance to the nearest transit station is binned into 0.05 mile bins, and top-coded at 1.5
miles. Therefore, there are 30 bins for this variable and the 31st represents all those who
are more than at 1.5 miles away from a transit stop. The variable can thus be thought of us
whether there is a transit stop within a certain radius from a given location.
A.3 Sample Construction
The elimination process leads to the inclusion of destination zipcodes in the sample where
no commuter pays for parking. This can be illustrated with the help of Figure A.1. Suppose
we start off with destination zipcodes in the CHTS that look like one of the hypothetical
areas in panel (a). Zipcode A represents a destination where some commuters and some non-
commuters pay for parking. Zipcode B, on the other hand, represents a destination where no
commuter pays for parking and only some non-commuters pay for parking; whereas zipcode
C represents one where no one pays for parking regardless of the trip purpose. Dropping
destination zipcodes where no one pays for parking eliminates zipcodes C from the sample.
Therefore, all trips made to area C are eliminated, regardless of purpose. The destination
zipcodes remaining in the sample are zipcodes A and B. The following round of elimination
then removes non-commuters from zipcodes A and B, and hence only commuters going to
either areas A or B remain in the sample. Notice now that in panel (b) no one pays for
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Figure A.1: Sample Construction
parking in zipcode B although the area itself survives the elimination process. Zipcode B is
not eliminated from the sample because although commuters happen not to pay for parking,
a price for parking exists in that area and is paid by some non-commuters, implying that
the true market price for parking is a positive value.
A.4 Sample Selection Model
To see how this works, let us first assume that parking prices are a function of location,
represented by zipcodes, and of the characteristics of commuters. Parking prices can thus
be modeled as follows:
ln(P ∗i ) = Ziαz +Xiαx + νi (A.1)
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where Zi is a matrix of dummy variables for the destination zipcodes. Therefore, parking
price is modeled as a function of location characteristics, represented by Zi, and individual
characteristics, represented by Xi. Equation A.1 is used to impute ln(P
∗
i ) values.
Following Lee (1979), equation 1.3 can be re-written as such:
ln(Pi) =
 Ziαz +Xiαx + νi if Ziαz +Xiαx + Yiβy + ui > 0− if Ziαz +Xiαx + Yiβy + ui ≤ 0 (A.2)
The error terms, νi and ui, are assumed to be serially independent, and normally distributed
with mean 0, such that:
νi
ui
 ∼ N

 0
0
 ,
 σ2ν σν,u
σν,u σ
2
u


and σ2ν is normalized to 1. The simultaneous equation system presented above can be written
in a reduced form by substituting equation A.1 into equation 1.1. Hence, equation 1.1 can
be written in reduced form as:
D∗i = Ziγz +Xiγx + Yiγy + i (A.3)
where γz =
βPαz
σ
, γx =
βPαx + βx
σ
, γy =
βy
σ
, i =
ui + βPνi
σ
, and σ2 = E( ui + βPνi)
2.
Equation A.2 can now be presented in reduced form as follows:
ln(Pi) =
 Ziαz +Xiαx + νi if Ziγz +Xiγx + Yiγy + i > 0− if Ziγz +Xiγx + Yiγy + i ≤ 0 (A.4)
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Since i is truncated, then standard least squares estimation would lead to inconsistent esti-
mates as is the case with standard Tobit models. On the other hand, Maximum Likelihood
(ML) estimation produces estimates that are both consistent and efficient1. The error terms,
i and nui, are assumed to be jointly normally distributed and homoscedastic. The likelihood
function to be maximized is as follows:
L =
n∏
i
Pr(D∗i ≤ 0)1−Di [f(ln(Pi)|D∗i > 0)Pr(D∗i > 0]Di (A.5)
where f(ln(Pi)|D∗i > 0) is the conditional density of ln(Pi) given Di = 1, Pr(D∗i ≤ 0)1−Di
represents the likelihood over the observations where Di = 0, and f(ln(Pi)|D∗i > 0)Pr(D∗i >
0]Di represents the likelihood over the observations where Di = 1
2.
The ML results for both the parking price estimation equation and the selection equation,
equations A.2 and A.4 respectively, are presented in Table A.3.
1The model could also be estimated using Heckman’s two-step estimation, but the estimates would be
inefficient, and, therefore, ML estimation is preferred.
2The density of parking prices is equal to the probability of the commuter driving, i.e. Pr(Di = 1),
multiplied by the conditional probability of parking prices given that the commuter drives, i.e. f(ln(Pi)|Di =
1) This results in the f(ln(Pi)|Di = 1)Pr(Di = 1) part of the likelihood function. This is raised to the power
Di because this part holds only if the commuters drive, i.e., this part holds only if Di = 1. If the commuter
does not drive, then Di = 0, and so f(ln(Pi)|Di = 1)Pr(Di = 1) reduces to 1. Furthermore, if the commuter
does not drive then that fact is the only thing observed. That is, if Di = 0, then the density for parking
prices is just the probability of the commuter not driving, which is represented by Pr(Di = 0). This is
raised to the power (1 − Di) because it holds only when Di = 0, and reduces to 1 if Di = 1. Therefore,
the likelihood is just the probability of the commuter not driving if the commuter does not drive, and is
the product of the probability of driving and the condition probability of parking prices on driving if the
commuter drives.
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Table A.3: Selection Model Estimation)
Dependent Variable: Di ln(Price)
(Eq A.3) (Eq A.4)
ln(Income) 0.123*** 0.006
(0.030) (0.007)
Age 0.005*** -0.001***
(0.001) 0.000
Female -0.048 0.033***
(0.043) (0.010)
High School 0.419*** 0.002
(0.112) (0.032)
College Degree -0.119** 0.01
(0.050) (0.012)
White -0.001 0.025**
(0.050) (0.012)
ln(Distance) 0.142***
(0.019)
Transit-Work Distance 0.014**
(0.006)
Transit-Home Distance 0
(0.003)
Peak -0.175***
(0.043)
Chain 0.153***
(0.055)
Observations 5816
Wald Chi2 789.387
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are
clustered at the zipcode level
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Estimations include a constant and zipcode fixed ef-
fects
123
Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendix
Table B.1: MSAs
MSA Code MSA
CA Sample
31100 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
40900 Sacramento–Roseville-Arden-Arcade, CA
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA
NY-NJ Sample
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
MA Sample
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH
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Table B.2: Data Sources
Variable Source
Transit Use Travel Survey
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Income Travel Survey
Household Size Travel Survey
Age Travel Survey
White Travel Survey
Female Travel Survey
Neighborhood Characteristics
Population Density Constructed by Author
Population ACS
Area TIGER shapefile
Job Density Constructed by Author
Jobs LEHD WAC files
Area TIGER shapefile
Commuter White Rate CTPP
Median Commuter Income CTPP
Transit Accessibility
Distance to Rail Station Constructed by Author
Workplace Location Travel Survey
Residence Location Travel Survey
Rail Station Location NTAD,
Transportation Agency shapefiles
Trip Characteristics
Distance Constructed by Author
Workplace Location Travel Survey
Residence Location Travel Survey
Time Difference Constructed by Author
Workplace Location Travel Survey
Residence Location Travel Survey
Transit Duration Google Maps API Distance Matrix
Driving Duration Google Maps API Distance Matrix
Parking Prices Constructed by Author
Workplace Location Travel Survey
Parking Prices ParkMe.com
Gas Expense Constructed by Author
Workplace Location Travel Survey
Residence Location Travel Survey
Gas Price GasBuddy.com
Driving Distance Google Maps API Distance Matrix
Social Influence Measures
Transit Use Rate CTPP
Median Transit Income CTPP
White Transit User Rate CTPP
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Table B.3: Data Sources for IV and Robustness Checks
Variable Source
IV
Weighted Average Commute Distance Constructed by Author
Workplace Location Travel Survey
Residence Location Travel Survey
Jobs LEHD OD Files
Robustness Checks
Pedestrian-Oriented Intersections EPA
Land Use Mix EPA
Rail Station Count Constructed by Author
Workplace Location Travel Survey
Residence Location Travel Survey
Rail Station Location NTAD,
Transportation Agency shapefiles
Gini Coefficient ACS
Unemployment Rate ACS
Population below 18 ACS
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